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General Introduction 
I. Thesis Statement 
The present thesis proposes a theory of tradition that allows us to interpret the development of 
tradition according to Dei Verbum, exploring how the Catholic tradition develops in continuity 
with the apostolic faith, teaching, and practice. In order to construct this theory, I integrate 
Nancey Murphy’s research program for theology and Imre Lakatos’s theory of scientific 
progress into Terrence Tilley’s practical theory of tradition.  
 
II. Reasons to Write the Thesis 
The best way to introduce the thesis is perhaps to explain why I come to write it, and why the 
notion of the development of tradition has become an important subject of study in Catholic 
theology since the Second Vatican Council.  
 
When I was an undergraduate student of theology, I studied philosophy and theology in 
Melbourne, Australia. One of the subjects that I studied was the Philosophy of Science. My 
professor John Honner helped me understand various models in which philosophers of science 
conceived the development of scientific knowledge. I am particularly interested in a model of 
development of knowledge proposed by Imre Lakatos (1922-1974). Lakatos was a philosopher 
of mathematics and of science.1 He considers science and the development of scientific 
knowledge as “a scientific research program.” In concrete terms, a scientific research program is 
a network of interrelated theories, whose core theory must not be rejected in the course of the 
                                                     
1 For biographical information on Imre Lakatos, see Ian Hacking, “Imre Lakatos’s Philosophy of Science,” British 
Journal for the Philosophy of Science 30 (1979), 381-402; John Worrall, “Imre Lakatos (1922-1974): Philosopher of 
Mathematics and Philosopher of Science,” in Essays in Memory of Imre Lakatos: Boston Studies in the Philosophy of 
Science 39 (1976), 1-8; and Paul Feyerabend, “Imre Lakatos,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 26 
(1975), 1-18. 
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program’s development, while surrounding theories protect the core from being falsified and 
further articulate the meaning of the core theory.2  
 
Upon the completion of my Bachelor of Theology in Melbourne, I came to Boston College 
School of Theology and Ministry and began my Licentiate in the Sacred Theology. In the first 
year of the program, I took a reading course on the subject of Tradition under the guidance of 
Professor Richard Lennan. He recommended that I read Terrence Tilley’s Inventing Catholic 
Tradition.3 In this work, Tilley presents a practical approach to the concept of tradition. He views 
tradition as an ongoing set of practices constantly being invented and reinvented by a community 
of practitioners. Accordingly, an actual tradition is changeable by its very nature. It is not a 
“thing” with a definite “essence,” but is a living organism which through “practices” adapts itself 
to its environments and contextual changes, in order to pass on its contents from one generation 
to another. 
 
At the end of the course, I realized that the concept of tradition, especially the Catholic tradition, 
is more complex than I had imagined. I used to understand tradition as a fixed reality that 
belongs to the past. Tradition was viewed as unchangeable and constant, as having ended with 
the death of the last apostles. This notion of tradition was challenged by the teaching of Vatican 
II. In Article 8 of Dei Verbum, Vatican II’s Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation, we find 
the teaching of the Council on the development of tradition. As the bishops of Vatican II clearly 
state in the second paragraph of Article 8:  
                                                     
2 See Imre Lakatos, “Criticism and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes,” Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society, 69 (1968-1969), 149-86. This paper is reprinted in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, 
edited by Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 91-196. 
3 Terrence Tilley, Inventing Catholic Tradition (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 2000). 
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The tradition that comes from the apostles makes progress in the church, with the 
help of the Holy Spirit. There is a growth in insight into the realities and words 
that are being passed on. This comes about through the contemplation and study 
of believers, who ponder these things in their hearts. It comes from the intimate 
sense of spiritual realties which they experience. And it comes from the preaching 
of those who, on succeeding to the office of bishop, have received the sure 
charism of truth. Thus, as the centuries go by, the church is always advancing 
towards the plenitude of divine truth, until eventually the words of God are 
fulfilled in it.4 
 
Dei Verbum announces a truth that the bishops of the Council want to claim: the apostolic 
tradition does develop in the church. If tradition develops in insight and is not a fix reality 
belonging to the past, how can we interpret the development of tradition? In what sense does the 
tradition develop in continuity with the apostolic faith, teaching and practice? Is it possible for us 
to analyze the mechanics of the development of tradition?  
 
These questions have interested me, and thus I began to seek answers when the reading course 
with Professor Lennan came to the end. The present thesis is an attempt to interpret Dei 
Verbum’s teaching on the development of tradition, providing a theory that allows us to explain 
the development of tradition. This theory integrates the insights of Murphy’s research program 
for theology and Lakatos’s theory of scientific progress into Tilley’s theory of tradition, using 
them as a framework of imagination to explore how the Catholic tradition develops in continuity 
                                                     
4 Dei Verbum, Article 8, in Vatican II: Constitutions, Decrees, and Declarations, translated and edited by Austin 
Flannery, (New York: Costello Publishing Company, 1996).  
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with the apostolic faith, teaching and practice. In the course of this thesis, I argue that we can 
obtain a satisfactory account of the development of tradition if we combine Tilley’s practical 
theory of tradition with Murphy’s research program and Lakatos’s theory. Accordingly, I 
propose a scientific practical theory of tradition. This theory attempts to interpret the 
development of tradition according to Dei Verbum, showing how the Catholic tradition develops 
in continuity with the apostolic faith, teaching, and practice.  
 
The thesis is likely to appeal to those who want to explore the interface between systematic 
theology and philosophy of science on the assumption that this engagement is necessary, 
legitimate, and productive for the task of theology as well as for the ongoing dialogue between 
the philosophy of science and systematic theology.  
 
III. Synopsis of the Thesis 
The thesis will be developed in the following manner. Chapter One interprets the development of 
tradition according Dei Verbum. In order to so, I shall first present Terrence Tilley’s practical 
theory of tradition as a case study of the reception of Dei Verbum. Then I apply his theory to 
interpret the development of tradition. Chapter Two of the thesis integrates Lakatos’s theory of 
scientific progress into Tilley’s theory of tradition. I shall show how Lakatos’s theory 
circumvents the weakness of Tilley’s theory, and offers a more comprehensive account of the 
development of tradition. Accordingly, I propose a scientific practical theory of tradition to 
explain how the tradition develops in continuity with the apostolic faith, teaching and practice. 
Using the scientific practical theory of tradition as presented in Chapter Two, Chapter Three 
makes a proposal for the development of Catholic Intellectual Tradition. I shall explore the 
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extent to which the scientific practical theory of tradition helps us understand the development of 
Catholic Intellectual Tradition.  
 
The thesis concludes with a summary of my whole work. I shall draw theoretical and practical 
implications of the work, raising further questions regarding the scientific practical theory of 
tradition and the development of tradition according to Dei Verbum. I am confident that the 
questions addressed above will find their answers at the final stage of the thesis.  
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Chapter I: Dei Verbum and the Development of Tradition 
As I stated in the thesis’s Introduction, we find the notion of the development of tradition in 
Article 8 of Dei Verbum, the Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation. The Council’s 
bishops solemnly proclaim that the apostolic tradition is not a fixed reality that belongs to the 
past. It does develop in insight into the realities and words being passed on. To understand why 
and how this notion came into the final text of Dei Verbum, I shall first give a historical account 
of the dominant theories of tradition that immediately preceded Vatican II. Having done so, I 
present a history of Dei Verbum with the focus on the background and content of Article 8. The 
purpose of this part is to position the teaching of Dei Verbum on tradition in its historical context, 
showing its significance in relation to the theories of tradition that preceded it. In order to explain 
how a tradition develops, I present Tilley’s practical theory of tradition as a case study of the 
reception of Dei Verbum, and then apply his theory to interpret the development of tradition.  
 
Part I: A History of Dei Verbum and the Catholic Theories of Tradition  
Before giving a history of Dei Verbum, it is necessary for my purpose here to sketch out the 
Council of Trent’s teaching on tradition and the development of Catholic theories of tradition 
between Trent and Vatican II. Facing the Protestant principle of sola scriptura, the bishops of 
Trent claimed that scripture should not be considered sufficient as the only legitimate source of 
doctrine. Although scripture contains all truth of faith and morality, one cannot understand the 
message of salvation without reliance on tradition, enshrined in the works of the church’s fathers 
and in the ecclesiastical doctrines. The bishops held that the authority of tradition is not less than 
that of scripture. Both scripture and tradition come from God. Therefore, they must be received 
12 
 
with equal reverence.5 In order to explain the relation between scripture and tradition, the 
bishops were inclined to claim that divine revelation was contained partim (partly) in written 
books and partim (partly) in unwritten tradition. Nevertheless, for reasons that were not entirely 
clear from the acts of the Council, the terms partim … partim were replaced by the conjunction 
et (and) in the final text of Trent’s first decree Acceptance of the Sacred Books and Apostolic 
Traditions:6 
 
… that the purity of the Gospel, purged of all errors, may be preserved in the 
Church … [that Gospel] which was promised beforehand by the prophets in the 
sacred scriptures, and which he [Christ] then ordered to be preached to every 
creature through his apostles as the source of all saving truth and moral discipline. 
The Council clearly perceives that this truth and rule are contained in written 
books and in unwritten traditions, which were received by the apostles from the 
mouth of Christ himself, or else have come down to us, handed on as it were from 
the apostles themselves at the inspiration of the holy Spirit.7 
 
After Trent in the period of Catholic Reform, the relation between scripture and tradition is often 
interpreted as though divine revelation is passed on partly in the canonical scriptures, and partly 
in the apostolic tradition. Accordingly, tradition is described as one source of the apostolic 
doctrines, which is not attested by the canonical scriptures considered as the other source. The 
two source theory of revelation considers tradition as constant, static, and there is little place for 
                                                     
5 Hubert Jedin, A History of the Council of Trent, vol. 2, translated by Dom Graf (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 
1958), 81-2, 86-7. 
6 Jedin, A History of the Council of Trent, vol. 2, 87.  
7 This text can be found in Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, vol. 2, edited by Norman Tanner (Washington: 
Georgetown University Press, 1990). 
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the development of tradition. We find this interpretation of tradition in the writings of Jesuit 
controversialists such as Peter Canisius, Edmund Campion, Antonio Possevino, and Robert 
Bellarmine.8 Also this view finds its way into Pius XII’s encyclical Humani Generis (1950), in 
which the Pope addressed such questions as evolution, revelation, theological method, and 
existentialism.9 Again the same theory of tradition appears in De Fontibus, the draft of A 
Dogmatic Constitution on the Sources of Revelation, which was prepared by the Doctrinal 
Commission between 1960 and 1962.10  
 
Along with the two source theory of revelation that considers tradition as one source of the 
development of doctrine, Yves Congar points out four dominant theories of tradition that existed 
in the nineteenth century.11 In Germany, the Catholic School of Tübingen conceives tradition as 
a living subject. Johann Möhler (1796 – 1838), one of the leading members of the school, 
criticizes the idea that divine revelation is handed on partly in the canonical scriptures, and partly 
in the oral traditions. In his Unity in the Church first published in 1825, Möhler draws an 
analogy between the collective spirit of Germany and the sense of the faithful abiding in the 
church as a whole.12 Accordingly, he understands tradition as a collective sense of the faith that 
the Spirit of Christ grants to the church. The Spirit is the One, who not only has animated the 
ecclesiastical body since Pentecost, but also has ensured its unity through history in the diversity 
                                                     
8 See John Donnelly, “Jesuit Controversialists and the Defense of Tridentine Tradition,” in The Quadrilog: Tradition 
and the Future of Ecumenism, edited by Kenneth Hagen (Minnesota: The Liturgical Press, 1994), 94-109. 
9 See Humani Generis, article 21, cited from 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/pius_xii/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xii_enc_12081950_humani-
generis_en.html 
10 See Joseph Komonchak’s translation of Draft of A Dogmatic Constitution on the Sources of Revelation attached at 
the appendix of the thesis. 
11 Yves Congar, Tradition and Traditions: A Historical and Theological Essay, translated by M. Naseby and T. 
Rainborough (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 189-221.  
12 Johann Möhler, Unity in the Church, edited and translated by Peter C. Erb (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University 
of America Press, 1996). 
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of its members and local communities. 
 
In France, Maurice Blondel (1861 – 1949), a Catholic philosopher, develops a philosophical 
system in which he conceives action as one source of development of knowledge. Applying this 
theory to the theology of tradition, Blondel claims that tradition transmits a “tacit” component of 
faith, that is, the aspect of faith that cannot be spelled out in verbal statements.13 Blondel opposes 
both extrinsicism and historicism regarding the church’s dogmas. While extrinsicism considers 
dogma as purely speculative statements and excludes the contribution of historical facts in the 
process of forming the church’s dogmas, historicism reduces the spiritual reality of faith to the 
written documents alone.14 Blondel holds that tradition sustains in the community of believers a 
vital sense of the divine realities to which Christians are committed in faith through actions. The 
primary vehicle of tradition is not words, but believers’ faithful actions, including the liturgy of 
the church. 
  
In Italy, the Jesuits of the Roman School emphasize the role of the magisterium as the principal 
agent that makes known to the faithful the canon of faith. The magisterium not only safeguards 
the apostolic faith, teaching, and practice, but also develops the explicit content of faith. The 
theologians of the Roman school, notably G. Perrone (1794 – 1876) and J. B. Franzelin (1816 – 
1886), promote the theology of magisterium, in order to explain the coming of such doctrines as 
the Immaculate Conception and the Assumption of Mary, and the infallibility of the pope when 
he speaks as the highest authority of the church on matters of faith and morals.15 Franzelin 
                                                     
13 Maurice Blondel, The Letter on Apologetics, and History and Dogma, presented and translated by Alexander Dru 
and Illtyd Trethowan (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965) 
14 Blondel, The Letter on Apologetics, and History and Dogma, 226-64 
15 Congar, Tradition and Traditions, 196-206.  
15 
 
himself distinguishes between “active tradition” and “objective tradition.” In its objective sense, 
tradition is made up of the deposit of doctrines and ecclesiastical institutions, which have been 
handed on from the beginning of Christianity. In its active sense, tradition consists of the acts of 
transmission. Franzelin recognizes the role of the faithful in the conservation of the deposit of 
faith, but he insists on the transmission of objective tradition by the magisterium alone.16 
 
In England, John Henry Newman (1801 – 1890) distinguishes between the prophetic tradition 
and the apostolic tradition. According to Newman, the latter is continuous, invariant, and 
infallible, while the former is an ongoing and unofficial commentary of the latter. In other words, 
the prophetic tradition mediates the apostolic tradition to believers, proposing new expressions to 
understand, articulate, and faithfully present the apostolic faith. Nevertheless, the prophetic 
tradition adds nothing substantial to the apostolic tradition.17 When Newman became a Catholic, 
he abandons the above distinction, arguing that the scriptures never exist alone without the 
interpretation of ecclesial authority. Because the church’s teaching offices alone could define 
new doctrines, the apostolic tradition is not constant and immutable as Vincent of Lerins 
maintains: Quod ubique, quod semper, quod ab omnibus, that is, “what has been believed 
everywhere, always, and by everyone.” According to Newman, the actual tradition develops 
through a harmonious interaction between the ecclesiastical magisterium and the sense of the 
faithful. Although the hierarchical magisterium and the faithful conserve and hand on the 
apostolic tradition, the magisterium alone can judge and define a truth of faith that becomes a 
church’s dogma or a law of the church.  
 
                                                     
16 On Franzelin’s theory of tradition, see James P. Mackey, The Modern Theology of Tradition (New York: Herder 
and Herder, 1963), especially chapter 1. 
17 Gunter Biemer, Newman on Tradition (London: Burns & Oates, 1967). 
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Having presented the above theories of tradition, we are now in a position to show a history of 
Dei Verbum and the extent to which these theories influenced the teaching of Dei Verbum on 
tradition. It is well-known that Dei Verbum did not grow out of the schema introduced to the 
Council’s bishops on the first day of its discussion. In reality, the Doctrinal Commission, led by 
its powerful head Cardinal Alfredo Ottaviani, had carefully prepared the schema De Fontibus 
(On the Sources of Revelation) between 1960 and 1962. Then Ottaviani himself introduced the 
schema to the bishops on 14 November 1962. De Fontibus consists of five chapters: The 
Twofold Source of Revelation; The Inspiration, Inerrancy, and Literary Composition of Sacred 
Scripture; The Old Testament; The New Testament; and The Sacred Scripture in the Church.18  
 
In his commentary on De Fontibus, Joseph Ratzinger states: “All the relevant questions were 
decided in a purely defensive spirit: the greater extent of tradition in comparison with Scripture, 
a largely verbalistic conception of the idea of inspiration, the narrowest interpretation of 
inerrancy, a conception of the historicity of the Gospels that suggested that there were no 
problems, etc.”19 Another commentator Pieter Smulders, a Dutch theologian, who was asked by 
Archbishop Giuseppe Beltrami to study De Fontibus, “perceived such a one-sided insistence on 
revelation as locutio divina that the schema leaves divine works, God’s opera magnalia, outside 
revelation itself.” 20Accordingly, the schema opposes the view that divine revelation comprises 
both God’s saving deeds and verbal communication by God’s spokespersons. It fears the 
reduction of divine revelation to the realm of human experience alone. 
 
                                                     
18 Draft of A Dogmatic Constitution on the Sources of Revelation. 
19 Joseph Ratzinger, “Origin and Background,” edited by H. Vorgrimler, Commentary on the Documents of Vatican 
II, vol. 3 (New York: Herder and Herder, 1969), 159. 
20 See Jared Wicks’ study of the contributions of Pieter Smulders and other periti before and during Vatican II’s 
opening weeks in his “Vatican II on Revelation – From Behind the Scenes,” Theological Studies 71 (2010), 643. 
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When we make a close examination of De Fontibus, it becomes evident that there is no reference 
to the concepts of tradition according to Möhler’s and Blondel’s theories. Both the Roman theory 
and Newman’s theory appear in the text to the extent that De Fontibus mentions the relationship 
between the scriptures, tradition and the church’s teaching office. The two source theory of 
revelation clearly comes into view in Article 4 of chapter I. As stated by the Doctrinal 
Commission: “Instructed by the commands and examples of Christ and of the Apostles, 
therefore, Holy Mother Church has always believed, and believes still that the complete 
revelation is not contained in Scripture alone, but in Scripture and in Tradition as in a twofold 
source, although in different ways.”21 Having claimed its teaching on the two source theory of 
revelation, the Commission declared: “Let no one, therefore, dare to consider Tradition to be of 
inferior worth or refuse it his faith … Tradition and it alone is the way in which some revealed 
truths, particularly those concerned with the inspiration, canonicity and integrity of each and 
every sacred book, are clarified and become known to the Church.”22 
 
How did the bishops of Vatican II respond to De Fontibus? As the history of the Council 
unfolded on 14 November 1962, Achille Liénart was the first bishop to reject the schema: “It is 
unacceptable,” he said. Liénart stated that De Fontibus must be completely revised because it 
misconstrued the teaching of Trent on the relation between scripture and tradition.23 When 
Lienart finished, Joseph Frings, Jan Bernard Alfrink, Joseph Elmer Ritter, Maximos IV Saigh, 
and Émile-Joseph De Smedt one after another criticized De Fontibus during a week of debate. 
By contrast, the bishops Quiroga y Palacios, Ernesto Ruffini, and Giuseppe Siri defended the 
schema as the legitimate text for further discussion. Finally, on 20 November 1962, 1368 bishops 
                                                     
21 Draft of A Dogmatic Constitution on the Sources of Revelation, Article 4.  
22 Ibid., Article 5.  
23 John O’Malley, What Happened at Vatican II (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008), 144. 
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of the Council voted to discontinue the debate, while 822 bishops voted to continue the 
discussion of the schema.24 “Yielding to the wishes of many,” Pope John XXIII intervened in the 
acts of the Council. He ordered De Fontibus to be revised by the members of both the Doctrinal 
Commission and the Secretariat for Promoting Christian Unity. The task of this new Commission 
would be “to emend the schema, shorten it, and make it more suitable, with an emphasis 
especially on general principles.”25 
 
René Latourelle states that the intervention of Pope John “was a turning point in the Council.”26 
When the new Commission was established, it was inclined toward consensus, and dodged 
disagreement among its members. Between 25 November and 7 December 1962, the 
Commission’s members generally agreed upon a new title De Divina Revelatione (On Divine 
Revelation). There was a tendency on the part of a group of French and Italian bishops, led by 
Archbishop Ermenegildo Florit, to incorporate the main themes of De Fontibus into The 
Constitution on the Church. However, on 4 December 1963, in his closing speech at the end of 
the second session, the newly selected Pope Paul VI indicated that the subject of revelation 
should remain as an independent text. Therefore, the discussion on the subject was considered as 
one of the primary tasks of the Council’s third session.27    
 
Written responses to the draft on revelation were submitted between June 1963 and January 
1964. In light of these submissions, a special sub-committee of the Commission began to work 
on the draft on 7 March 1964. Under the influence of Yves Congar, Karl Rahner, and Pieter 
                                                     
24 Ibid., 144-50.  
25 AS I/3, 259, cited by O’Malley in What Happened at Vatican II, 150.  
26 René Latourelle, Theology of Revelation (New York: Alba House, 1966), 454.  
27 Ratzinger, Commentary on the Documents of Vatican II, 161-2. 
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Smulders, divine revelation was now considered as God’s self-communication in both words and 
deeds. According to Ratzinger, who was one of the commission’s members, the notion of the 
development of tradition made its first appearance in this period under the heading De Sacra 
Traditione. It was an attempt to meet the widely expressed need of the bishops for a clear and 
positive account of tradition.28 The material completeness of the scriptures, however, remained a 
debated subject. Thus, the commission agreed to leave open the question of the material 
sufficiency of scripture. This is evident in the compromise formulation found in Article 9 of Dei 
Verbum: “Thus, it is that the church does not draw its certainty (emphasis is mine) about all 
revealed truths from the Holy Scriptures alone. Hence, both scripture and tradition must be 
accepted and honored with equal devotion and reverence.”29 
 
As regards the development of tradition, Ratzinger states: “It is not difficult … to recognize the 
pen of Yves Congar in the text, and to see behind it the influence of the Catholic School of 
Tübingen of the nineteenth century with, in particular, its dynamic and organic idea of tradition, 
which in turn was strongly impregnated by the spirit of German Romanticism.”30 Ratzinger’s 
statement is justified when we compare the teaching of Dei Verbum on the topic with the idea of 
tradition presented by Congar in his Tradition and Traditions. It is not my purpose here, 
however, to show a striking similarity between the teaching of Dei Verbum on tradition and 
Congar’s theory of tradition.31 What I give in the following is an interpretation of the 
development of tradition along with some of its criticisms.  
                                                     
28 Ratzinger, Commentary on the Documents of Vatican II, 184. 
29 Dei Verbum, Article 9. 
30 Ratzinger, Commentary on the Documents of Vatican II, 184. 
31 For a comparison between Congar’s thoughts on tradition and the teaching of Dei Verbum on the development 
of tradition, see Frederick Jelly, “Tradition as the Development of Dogma according to Yves Congar,” edited by 
Kenneth Hagen, The Quadrilog: Tradition and the Future of Ecumenism (Minnesota: Liturgical, 1994), 189-207. 
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Dei Verbum speaks of the concept of tradition in a particular manner, that is, the tradition that 
comes from the apostles or the apostolic tradition. Two questions that arise from this distinction 
are: What is the meaning of “tradition”? What is “the apostolic tradition”? According to Congar, 
there are three interrelated aspects of meaning regarding the concept of “tradition:” (1) the 
transmission of the whole Gospel, that is, the whole Christian mystery manifested in the 
scriptures, the confessions of faith, and the sacraments together with the realities that they 
convey; (2) the interpretations or the meanings given to the realities transmitted within a 
community of believers; and (3) “the interpretation or reading of Scripture that was developed 
and expressed in a whole series of fixed testimonies, whether in writings or monuments: 
institutions, liturgy, art, customs, etc.”32 Building on Congar’s concept of tradition, I understand 
“the apostolic tradition” as the transmission of the whole Christian mystery along with the 
interpretations of the scriptures, which are traceable to the apostles, “who handed on, by oral 
preaching, by their example, by their dispositions, what they themselves had received – whether 
from the lips of Christ, from his way of life and his works.”33 This tradition is transmitted to us 
through the communities of believers associated with the apostles, living in and out the words 
and works that come from the apostles and the church’s teaching authority.  
 
Dei Verbum claims that under the guidance of the Spirit, the apostolic tradition develops in 
accordance with three ways. It develops through the contemplation and study of believers, 
through the spiritual experiences of faith that they encounter, and through the teachings of 
bishops, who have received the sure charism of truth. One thus should note that Dei Verbum 
acknowledges the Spirit as the guiding principle of the development of tradition. The Spirit of 
                                                     
32 Congar, Tradition and Traditions, 287-8. 
33 Dei Verbum, Article 7. 
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Christ, as Lumen Gentium further explains, dwells in the church and in the hearts of the faithful, 
guiding them to all truth, uniting them in ministry, constantly renewing the church, and leading 
the church to a perfect union with Christ in the eschaton.34 These activities of the Spirit show 
that an authentic development of tradition demands its principal cause be above the finite 
capacities of human persons. Divine revelation itself and everything that it encompasses such as 
the Creed, the church’s doctrines, and the scriptures, etc., are beyond the natural endowments of 
our cognitive and affective capacity to interpret and to understand. Any theories of development 
that limit its sources to our reason and human will alone or any other non-graced power of our 
embodied spirits are inadequate to account for the development of tradition.  
 
Along with the church’s teaching authority, Dei Verbum states that the church’s understanding of 
the original truth of faith develops in insight into the words and realities through the reflection 
and study of believers together with the intimate sense of the spiritual realities that they 
experience. The development of tradition is thus “not seen simply as a function of the hierarchy, 
but is anchored in the whole life of the Church.”35 The whole spiritual experience and the 
reflection of the church, its believing, studying, praying, and loving relationship with the Lord 
and his Word, causes the church’s understanding of the original truth to grow in insight into the 
realities and words. In this process of understanding, the work of the church’s teaching office is 
considered as one of the primary components of the development of tradition, but it should not 
be considered as the whole.  
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Although Dei Verbum mentions the three ways in which the apostolic tradition develops, it does 
not show how these ways relate to one another under the guidance of the Spirit. In my view, the 
Council’s bishops leave open this question for theologians, Catholic intellectuals, and the rest of 
the faithful to work out a theory of the development of tradition. What Dei Verbum claims is that 
the apostolic tradition does develop “in insight into the realities and words that are being passed 
on.”36 This statement was strongly attacked by two Council’s bishops, Ernesto Ruffini and Paul-
Émile Léger. Although the two held different viewpoints in many other theological issues, they 
share a similar objection to the notion of the development of tradition.37 Ruffini emphasizes that 
divine revelation ended with the death of the last apostle. He rejects the inclusion of apostles’ 
disciples among the origin of revelation, opposing the idea of a living and growing tradition. In a 
similar way, Léger argues that the idea of development of tradition blurs the distinction between 
the apostolic tradition and the post-apostolic tradition. This view endangers the strict 
transcendence of divine revelation when it confronts the statements and actions of the church’s 
teaching office. Léger states that the church should bind itself to the unchangeable word of God 
that does not grow. Revelation is constantly assimilated afresh among the faithful, and should not 
be manipulated by the church. 
 
According to Ratzinger, the Commission carefully considered Ruffini’s and Léger’s objections. 
However, they decided not to make any major alterations in the document, and justified the 
development of tradition by claiming that the apostolic tradition develops in insight into the 
realties and worlds through the church’s understanding of the mystery of faith given at the 
                                                     
36 Dei Verbum, Article 8.  
37 Ruffini’s and Léger’s speeches used here are cited and summarized from Hampe’s Die Autoritat, pp. 112 ff. 
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beginning.38 By doing so, the Commission, on the one hand, held that the apostolic tradition 
“comprises everything that serves to make the people of God live their lives in holiness and 
increase their faith.”39 On the other hand, they followed Pope John’s statement in his opening 
speech of the Council, inviting Christians to “step forward toward a doctrinal penetration and a 
formation of consciousness in faithful and perfect conformity to the authentic doctrine.”40 
 
Part II: A Reception of Dei Verbum: Terrence Tilley’s Practical Theory of Tradition  
Having presented Dei Verbum’s teaching on the development of tradition, I now show how this 
teaching of the Council has been received into Roman Catholic theology. Within the purview of 
this chapter, I take Tilley’s practical theory of tradition as a case study to interpret the 
development of tradition. Before doing so, it is necessary to give an account of his theory.  
 
II. 1. Tilley’s Practical Theory of Tradition 
Tilley considers tradition as an ongoing set of practices constantly being invented and reinvented 
by a community of practitioners. Accordingly, an actual tradition is changeable by its very 
nature. It is not a “thing” with a definite “essence” as Ruffini understands it. Similar to Blondel’s 
action-based theory of tradition, Tilley views tradition as a living organism which through 
“practices” adapts itself to its environments and contextual changes, in order to pass on its 
contents from one generation to another. Tradition shapes beliefs, behaviors, and attitudes of 
those who participate in the “practices” of tradition. In turn, it is reshaped and reinvented by the 
very process of reception and handing on the contents of tradition. 
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To clarify the meaning of “practice,” Tilley borrows the Baptist theologian James McClendon’s 
concept of social practice, and then develops it to construct his theory. According to McClendon, 
“a ‘practice’ … is a complex series of human actions involving definite practitioners, who by 
these means and in accordance with these rules together seek the understood end.”41 
McClendon’s understanding of a true practice consists of four components: (1) practitioners who 
participate in the practices are well aware of their participation; (2) practitioners employ 
determinate means to obtain their ends; (3) they proceed according to the rules of grammar; (4) 
they strive for some ends beyond the means themselves. 
 
Tilley accepts McClendon’s concept of practice, and further articulates it in the three following 
aspects. First, he proposes that within a religious tradition, a shared vision is the end towards 
which a community of believers orientates its practices. Second, by engaging in a set of 
practices, one develops certain attitudes, dispositions, and postures appropriate for persons 
involved in a tradition. Third, by learning “the rules of grammar” that govern the practices, one 
comes to know how means and ends are connected in these patterns of practices.42 
 
In order to comprehend “the rules of grammar,” and how these rules relate to Tilley’s theory, I 
propose to review Ludwig Wittgenstein’s concept of grammar and its relation to theology. In 
§373 of his Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein claims: “Grammar tells you what kind of 
object anything is.”43 Wittgenstein never explains the connection between theology and 
grammar, and Tilley never uses this particular quote in his work. However, Tilley’s theory of 
tradition shows us how systematic theology might look if it is shaped according to Wittgenstein’s 
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42 Tilley, Inventing Catholic Tradition, 53-4. 
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concept of grammar.  
Wittgenstein adopts the concept of “grammar” to describe the working of the public and socially 
governed language. Grammar considered as consisting of the rules of correct syntactic and 
semantic usage becomes, in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, the wider and more 
elusive network of rules. Grammar is not abstract concepts or standards according to which some 
acts may be judged as right or wrong. Grammar, for Wittgenstein, is situated within regular 
activities which themselves not only entail the rules of grammar, but also show the essence of an 
object. “Essence,” Wittgenstein claims, “is expressed by grammar … Grammar tells what kind of 
object anything is.44 Accordingly, the rules of grammar are not technical instructions from on-
high for the correct usage of language, or the norms for meaningful language. By “the rules of 
grammar,” he means the concrete items such as sounds, marks or gestures, which are presented 
to persons and shape their behaviors. An enormous number of human activities are seen as 
instances of the rules of grammar. They include the acts of imitating the gestures and sounds 
which others make, converting marks into noises when one is reading music, chanting the 
number sounds in sequence, and so on.  
 
Applying Wittgenstein’s concept of grammar and McClendon’s view of practice to his theory of 
tradition, Tilley understands tradition as a set of enduring practices that shape the identity of a 
group of people, who live in and live out that tradition.45 A tradition develops when its 
participants follow the tradition’s rules of grammar, in order to faithfully receive, consciously 
pass on, and creatively reinvent the received contents of tradition. The key to Tilley’s theory is 
the idea that we must constantly invent and reinvent our tradition by adapting our practices when 
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the tradition faces contextual changes. “If conditions and contexts change and practices are not 
adapted and changes in them “invented,” the tradition withers away.”46 
 
In the practical theory of tradition, we participate in a tradition when we follow its rules of 
grammar, studying the rules to understand how they are applied in practices. The rules of a 
particular tradition are its grammar. Just as grammars are the guidelines for those who want to 
study a language, rules are the guidelines for those who want to participate in a set of practices 
within a tradition. These rules might be malleable and variously applied. However, they provide 
“negative” principles through which one understands, recognizes and participates in a tradition.47 
By this Tilley means a tradition is characterized by its “negative” principles that form the basic 
structure of that tradition. For example, he proposes five “negative” principles to identify the 
Catholic Intellectual Tradition. This tradition contains the following five principles: (1) the 
analogical imagination, characterized by the “both/and” thinking rather than the “either/or” of 
dialectical thought, a sacramental universe, and Catholic belief in the Incarnation; (2) a universal 
hope; (3) an inclusive community; (4) the church as sacramental, and thereby public in nature; 
and (5) a gracious God as the Source of all good things.  
 
II.2. Tilley’s Theory of Tradition and the Development of Tradition 
In my view, Tilley argues persuasively for his practical theory of tradition. He backs up the 
theory with examples taken from literature, philosophy, theology, anthropological theory, etc. In 
the end, Tilley defends the concept of truth in his theory against the criticisms of the postmodern 
thinkers such as Michel Foucault and Richard Rorty. Rorty argues for a “constructivist anti-
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27 
 
realist epistemology,” holding that our constructed languages, concepts and claims cannot match 
or mirror the “real” world.48 Accordingly, our concepts of God, the human person, religion, etc., 
are only human constructions. They are not the “things-in-the-world-independent-of-our-
language.” They are judged as truth or false in relation to a system of language used by a group 
of participants. Disagreeing with Rorty, Tilley argues for a “constructivist realist epistemology,” 
holding together in his account an “epistemological constructivism” and a “consequential 
realism.” In other words, he tries to show that although we construct a reality out of our 
language, the constructed reality is “real” for us through our practices. Tilley’s example of 
identifying sugar maples is worth noticing here to make clear the point. If one says that there are 
237 mature sugar maples in the field, his claim is true if he has the skill of identifying sugar 
maples, and has exercised that skill properly.49 
 
All in all, Tilley’s theory of tradition is rich and insightful. He shows the community of Catholic 
theologians a distinctive way to view the development of tradition in terms of practices or 
following the tradition’s rules of grammar. For the purpose of my paper here, we now turn to the 
question that I addressed at the beginning: How can Tilley’s theory help us to interpret the 
teaching of Dei Verbum on the development of tradition? 
 
In my view, Tilley’s theory reasonably accounts for the first two ways in which the apostolic 
tradition develops. It does so by explaining the development of tradition in terms of the 
believers’ practices of faith or following the tradition’s rules of grammar. When the early 
Christians followed their tradition’s rules of grammar, they participated in the tradition, and 
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thereby transmitted the received contents of revelation to another generation. By the tradition’s 
rules of grammar, I mean the rules of faith or the church’s defined dogmas through which 
believers consciously contemplate, study, and experience the spiritual realities inherited within 
the religious practices. In the context of Catholic faith, the apostolic tradition has been received, 
passed on, and continued to develop when believers participate in the sacraments, study the 
scriptures and the church’s dogmas, implement these teachings into their practices of faith, and 
reach out for values implicit in the practices themselves.  
 
According to Tilley’s theory, the key to the development of tradition is the idea that tradition 
develops when a community of believers consciously receives the contents of revelation and 
follows the tradition’s rules of grammar, in order to invent and reinvent the practices of tradition 
when the tradition faces contextual changes. In other words, when old practices are brought into 
a new place and time, they need to be re-expressed to give the meanings relevant for the 
practices of people. Accordingly, tradition develops “in insights into the realities and words that 
are being passed on.” In this process of transmission, the statements of faith first shape the 
practices of believers when they follow the tradition’s rules of grammar. These statements then 
are rearticulated and transformed by the very faith of those who consciously participate in the 
practices of tradition. Tilley here makes clear the process of “passing on” the contents of faith. 
He understands this process not as a passive act of transmission of faith as Franzelin and the 
Roman school understand, but as an active transmission when believers consciously participate 
in tradition under the guidance of the Spirit to receive, transmit, and reinvent the deposits of 
faith.  
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In the practical theory of tradition, practices become the place of encounter between the Spirit, 
the faithful, and the deposit of faith. Practices are the momentum and the heart of the 
development of tradition. Practices shape the faith of believers before the contents of faith are 
gradually formed to express and guide believers’ actions, behaviors, and attitudes. Therefore, the 
apostolic tradition develops in insights into the realities and words when a community of 
believers lives in and out the whole Christian mystery passing on from the apostles and those 
who associated with them. This view of practice explains how the apostolic tradition develops 
through the contemplation and study of believers as well as through the spiritual realties that they 
experience.  
 
In other words, the practical theory of tradition shows an intimate relationship between actions 
and words, between the growth of insights and the practices of believers, who experience the 
mystery of Christian reality in their lives of faith. This growth of insights through practices or 
following the rules of grammar that accounts for the development of tradition is the key to 
understanding Tilley’s theory of tradition. As long as the community of Christ’s disciples is still 
on the pilgrimage to the Kingdom of God, they live in and out their tradition, consciously 
transmit and constantly reinvent their faith through their contemplation and study of the words of 
God, through their present experience of spiritual realities that they encounter, and through the 
obedience to the church’s teaching office. 
 
Tilley’s theory of tradition reasonably accounts for the first two ways in which the apostolic 
tradition develops. However, the theory does not explain how the apostolic tradition develops 
through the teaching authority of the bishops, who have received the sure charism of truth. This 
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lacuna is manifested in Tilley’s proposal for the Catholic Intellectual Tradition, in which he 
chooses the five rules/principles of the tradition that I mentioned in II.1, stating that these rules 
are constituted neither by the Catholic intellectuals, nor by the institutional structures of the 
church’s authority.50 If that is the case, how can we be certain that these rules are normative and 
operative for the development of tradition? For the purpose of the whole thesis, I leave this point 
at the present, and shall further articulate it in my proposal for the development of Catholic 
Intellectual Tradition in Chapter Three of the thesis.  
 
Apart from the points that I have just mentioned, Tilley does not offer a theory of development 
that explains how the three ways in which the tradition develops relate to one another under the 
guidance of the Spirit. He argues that theories of development are “caught on the horns of a 
dilemma: either the arrogance of teleology or the indeterminateness of rules for evaluating 
changes.” 51 His argument is worthy to note here. I think that Tilley is right when he states that 
we are unable to construct a prospective progressive theory of tradition that predicts the future 
development of dogmas. The history of dogma has indeed showed that no theories can precisely 
envision the future development of the church’s teaching. However, within Catholic theology 
and Catholic tradition, we have authoritative rules to judge whether a development within the 
tradition is authentic, catholic, and continuous with the apostolic tradition.  
 
Gerald O’Collins’s examination of authoritative rules to interpret the Catholic tradition proves 
helpful for my purpose here. 52 He points out seven rules that guide our discernments of an 
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authentic tradition. They are the magisterium, the canon of St. Vincent of Lerins, the sense of 
faith, the continuity of tradition, the Creed, the apostolicity, and the scriptures.53 Although these 
rules are the subjects of discussion and need to be further qualified, if we are faithful to the 
teaching of Dei Verbum, the church’s teaching office should be considered as an authoritative 
rule to judge whether a development within the tradition is authentic, catholic, and apostolic.  
 
Conclusion  
Within the purview of this chapter, the task of constructing a definitive account of the 
development of tradition remains unfinished. I have given an historical account of the dominant 
theories of tradition that immediately preceded Vatican II, presented a history of Dei Verbum, 
and interpreted its teaching on the development of tradition. Then I used Tilley’s theory of 
tradition to show how the apostolic tradition develops when it is received into the church’s life, 
teaching, and practices. His theory helps us understand the teaching of Dei Verbum on the 
development of tradition through the practices of believers, when they follow the rules of faith to 
faithfully receive, consciously transmit, and creatively invent the received content of tradition.  
 
Although Tilley’s theory of tradition neither articulates how the apostolic tradition develops 
through the teaching of the bishops, nor offers a theory of development that explains the relation 
between the three ways of the development of tradition, the community of Catholic theologians 
can be grateful for his practical approach to tradition. His study sheds light on the actual 
transmission of tradition, partly explains the teaching of Dei Verbum on the development of 
tradition, and significantly contributes to our understanding of the practices of inventing the 
Catholic tradition.  
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Tilley’s theory, especially his proposal for the five rules of Catholic Intellectual Tradition, can be 
further developed if theologians and Catholic intellectuals work together to spell out the meaning 
of analogical imagination in relation to the principles of a universal hope, an inclusive 
community, and the church as sacramental. Together with the principle of God as a gracious 
One, these theories and others like them have been presented, and articulated by individual 
theologians within the Catholic tradition. In Chapter Three of the thesis, I shall bring these 
theories together, showing how they work together to develop a more comprehensive account of 
the Catholic Intellectual Tradition. By doing so, we may faithfully receive our tradition, and 
constructively hand on the apostolic faith from one generation to another until the day the words 
of God are fulfilled in the church of Christ. 
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Chapter II: A Scientific Practical Theory of Tradition  
In Chapter One, I argued that Tilley’s theory of tradition reasonably accounts for the first two 
ways in which the apostolic tradition develops according to Dei Verbum. However, his theory 
neither explains the role of the church’s teaching office in the development of tradition, nor 
shows how the three ways in which tradition develops relate to one another. This chapter, 
therefore, attempts to give a more comprehensive account of the development of tradition, 
proposing a theory that brings together the three ways of development of tradition. In order to do 
so, I integrate Imre Lakatos’s theory of scientific progress into Tilley’s theory of tradition. 
Lakatos is a philosopher of mathematics and of science.54 He views the development of scientific 
knowledge in terms of “a scientific research program.” In concrete terms, a scientific research 
program is a network of interrelated theories, whose core theory remains the same in the course 
of the program’s development, while surrounding theories protect the core theory and further 
articulate the core’s meaning in relation to other fields of knowledge.55  
 
Lakatos’s concept of a research program was first applied to systematic theology by the Baptist 
theologian Nancey Murphy in her Theology in the Age of Scientific Reasoning.56 Accordingly, I 
begin the chapter with a review of her proposal for a scientific theology, in which she uses 
Lakatos’s theory to construct a research program for theology. Having presented Murphy’s 
theological program, I construct a theory of the development of tradition that draws on her work 
                                                     
54 For biographical information on Lakatos, see Ian Hacking, “Imre Lakatos’s Philosophy of Science,” British Journal 
for the Philosophy of Science 30 (1979), 381-402; John Worrall, “Imre Lakatos (1922-1974): Philosopher of 
Mathematics and Philosopher of Science,” in Essays in Memory of Imre Lakatos: Boston Studies in the Philosophy of 
Science 39 (1976), 1-8; and Paul Feyerabend, “Imre Lakatos,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 26 
(1975), 1-18. 
55 See Imre Lakatos, “Criticism and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes,” Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society, 69 (1968-1969), 149-86. This paper is reprinted in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, 
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and Lakatos’s theory of the development of science – calling it a scientific practical theory of 
tradition. Then I explain how this theory helps us understand the development of tradition in 
continuity with the apostolic faith, teaching, and practice.  
 
Part I: Murphy’s Proposal for a Scientific Theology 
Murphy’s primary concern in her work is to provide a research program for theology that has the 
characteristics of an empirical science. Among other theories in the contemporary philosophy of 
science, she tries to prove Lakatos’s theory of scientific progress to be the best account of the 
development of empirical knowledge. Then she uses it to construct her theological program. 
Because of the purview of this chapter, I take for granted Murphy’s argument for Lakatos’s 
theory as the best account of scientific rationality. What I show in the following is her 
presentation of Lakatos’s theory and her research program for theology.  
 
1. Murphy’s Account of Lakatos’s Theory of Scientific Progress 
Murphy views Lakatos’s theory of science or Lakatos’s “methodology of a scientific research 
program” in these terms: science is a network of complex theories whose core theory remains the 
same in the course of its development, while auxiliary theories are modified and amplified to 
account for the core’s meaning and problematic observations.57 Lakatos and Murphy consider 
the core theory as the central theory of a research program. It is conjoined and protected by the 
program’s protective belt of negative and positive heuristic. The positive heuristic consists of a 
set of theories that guide the development of a research program, while the negative heuristic is 
simply a set of theories that protect the core from falsifications and criticisms.  
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In his influential paper “Criticism and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programs,” 
Lakatos himself illustrates the operation of a research program with the story of an imaginary 
planet P.58 P slightly disobeys the theory N. N is composed of the Newtonian core theories, that 
is, Newton’s three laws of motion and the law of gravitation, the initial theories of some 
planetary systems, and several observational theories. Would a Newtonian refute the core of 
Newton’s theory? The answer is obviously no. The Newtonian will try to do whatever he/she can 
to protect the core theory from being falsified. He may propose a theory concerning a hitherto 
unknown, a very small planet P1 that potentially perturbs the orbit of P. Then he estimates the 
orbit and the mass of P1, designing a bigger telescope in the confidence of finding P1’s 
conjectural orbit. If he fails in finding P1, he proposes another theory to save the core of the 
Newtonian program.  
 
According to Murphy, Lakatos’s above illustration of a research program shows us the 
characteristics of an immature science. Lakatos and then Murphy distinguish an immature 
science from a mature science.59 In Lakatos’s view, the mature science differs from the immature 
science in the sense that the former’s development of auxiliary theories proceeds according to a 
preconceived plan constructed by its positive heuristic. Meanwhile, the latter’s development of 
auxiliary theories is simply characterized by the core theory with its negative heuristic, that is, a 
plan to avoid falsifications of the core theory.60 In other words, while the immature science only 
finds ways to defend the core theory from falsifications, the mature science further clarifies the 
meaning of the core theory, increasing the relevance between data and the theories of research 
program.  
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Lakatos claims that the history of science is best understood by his “competing research 
programs.” He describes some of these programs as “progressive” and some as “degenerating.” 
A degenerating program is the one whose theoretical growth lags behind the development of 
information for which its theories must account for. This program gives only post hoc 
explanations of either chance discoveries or of facts anticipated by and discovered in a rival 
program. A research program, on the other hand, is progressing as long as its theoretical growth 
anticipates its empirical growth, that is, it keeps predicting novel facts with some success.61  
 
In order to clarify Lakatos’s view of a progressive program, Murphy proposes the three 
following conditions for a research program to be called progressive. First, each new version of 
the program, that is, the core theory and its auxiliary theories, preserves the un-refuted content of 
its predecessor. Second, the next version of the program has excess empirical contents over its 
predecessor. It predicts some novel and hitherto unexpected facts. Third, some of these facts are 
corroborated or provide evidence that support the research program.62 
 
Murphy further articulates two types of a progressive program. A research program is 
theoretically progressive when the first condition and the second condition are met. Only when 
three conditions are met, is a research program considered as empirically progressive.63 In other 
words, a transition from a version of a program to the next one is theoretically progressive if the 
latter program produces novel facts, and the same transition is empirically progressive if some of 
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these facts provide evidence that support the theories of the research program. By contrast, a 
research program is degenerating when its next version preserves the contents and theories of the 
previous one, but does not predict or discover any novel facts.64  
 
Given Lakatos’s research program as described above, can it be applied to systematic theology? 
We find the answer to this question by reviewing Murphy’s application of Lakatos’s research 
program to her theological program.  
 
2. The Applicability of Lakatos’s Theory for Murphy’s Scientific Theology 
In Murphy’s view, Lakatos’s theory has a normative power. It can guide scientists in their 
research, and reasonably accounts for the development of empirical knowledge in the history of 
science. Therefore, she advocates a research program for theology, arguing that theology is a 
science if it meets the two following conditions. The first regards the applicability of Lakatos’s 
theory to theology, that is, “there exist coherent series of theories in theology that have the 
formal properties of a research program.”65 The second involves the empirical progress of a 
theological program. Theology can be considered to be a science, Murphy argues, if occasionally 
it progresses empirically.66  
 
Applying Lakatos’s theory to systematic theology, Murphy constructs a theological program that 
has a core theory, a protective belt of negative and positive heuristic and theological data. Of 
these elements, the core theory constitutes the central framework of a research program. Giving 
it up is to reject the whole development of program. In her scientific theology, the core theory 
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“contains the theologian’s judgment about how to sum up the very minimum of the relevant 
community’s faith.”67 For example, the doctrine of the Trinity may operate as the core theory of 
orthodox Christianity, while the rest of the doctrines belonging to this research program are 
unified by their direct or indirect relation to one of the persons of the Trinity.  
 
By its nature, the core theory of a research program cannot stand alone. It is conjoined by a 
protective belt of auxiliary theories that function as the program’s positive and negative heuristic. 
Murphy identifies the positive heuristic with the dogmas of a particular Christian church. By 
“dogmas” she refers to the normative statements officially adopted by Christian communities 
such as the pronouncements of the Popes in Catholicism, the Augsburg Confession in 
Lutheranism, and the like. Meanwhile, she understands the concept of “doctrines” as the normal 
teachings of the churches that grow out of the core dogmas.  
 
According to Murphy, the negative heuristic is simply the set of rules that protect the core theory 
from falsification by making additions in the belt of auxiliary theories.68 In order to illustrate the 
operation of the negative heuristic, she picks up a core theory that claims: “God is both holy and 
revealed in Jesus Christ.” There are two potential falsifications to this theory: (1) sexism is 
sinful, and (2) there is evidence in the New Testament that Jesus discriminated against women. 
For example, no woman was included among the Twelve. These criticisms obviously affect the 
core theory. If Jesus was sexist, then either God was not holy or Jesus was not an adequate 
representation of God. Facing these falsifications, the program’s proponents will seek auxiliary 
theories to drive them away. They may, for example, add a theory regarding the effects of 
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patriarchal cultures on the worldview of the Gospel’s writers. With the help of this supporting 
theory, the core theory and the community’s faith are saved from being falsified.  
 
Theological data is the final component of Murphy’s theological program. She states that 
programs with different core theories will focus on different types of data. The choice of data, in 
her view, depends on the theologians’ judgments regarding how God reveals Himself in the 
world.69 For example, Wolfhart Pannenberg’s understanding of divine revelation in the whole of 
salvation history leads him to focus on both the scriptures and historical facts as theological 
data.70 Paul Tillich’s theology of culture gives him three main sources: the scriptures, the 
church’s history, and the history of religion and culture.71 According to Murphy, God reveals 
Himself in the scriptures and in the community’s discernments of spirits. Thus her choice for 
data is boiled down to two sources: the scriptures and the community’s judgments as the results 
of the discernment of spirits.72 In comparison with Pannenberg’s and Tillich’s theology, she 
believes that her sources not only record theological data upon which theories are based, but also 
reflect a deliberate attempt to find novel facts through the process of communal discernment of 
spirits.73  
 
With these formal components of a research program for theology, we see that Lakatos’s theory 
can be applied to systematic theology, and form a theological program. However, Murphy does 
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40 
 
not answer the question of whether her program has the characteristics of an empirical science. I 
shall explain why she avoids the question in my assessment of her scientific theology. Having 
described Murphy’s theological program, we are now in a position to present a scientific 
practical theory of tradition.  
 
Part II: A Scientific Practical Theory of Tradition  
In proposing a scientific practical theory of tradition, I integrate into Tilley’s theory a theological 
program of tradition that works through believers’ practice of faith or following tradition’s rules 
of grammar. In order to see how this program works, we first review a problem of Tilley’s 
practical theory of tradition.  
 
1. The Theological Program of Tradition  
In his theory of tradition, Tilley states that we have to constantly invent and reinvent tradition 
when the tradition faces contextual changes. Nevertheless, it is unclear what he means by 
inventing the tradition. What he says is that we have to carry out our tradition by participating in 
the practices of tradition, or rather following the tradition’s rules of grammar. My scientific 
practical theory of tradition, therefore, will analyze the mechanics of inventing tradition, 
bringing together the three ways of development of tradition according to Dei Verbum. This 
theory has the characteristics of Murphy’s theological program and Tilley’s theory of tradition. It 
is composed of the core theories, negative heuristic, positive heuristic and theological data.  
 
In Murphy’s theological program, the core theory is located at the center of a network of 
theories. It is protected and clarified by auxiliary theories functioning as the program’s protective 
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belt of negative and positive heuristic. This network of theories not only further articulates the 
meaning of the core, but also forbids anomalies that undermine the core theory. In the 
theological program of tradition, I understand the core theories as the statements of faith 
responding to divine revelation as it has been received in faith by the community of believers, 
proclaimed by the infallible teaching office of the church, and binding on all the faithful. These 
statements must be transmitted faithfully from one generation to another. For example, one of the 
program’s core theories may be described as follows: Jesus Christ is the Word of God, who 
became a human person, died to save us from our sins, and rose on the third day according to the 
scriptures.  
 
The core theories are protected, clarified, and transformed in their meanings by the program’s 
positive and negative heuristic. In order to further develop theological data of tradition, I identify 
the positive heuristic with Christian studies and reflections on the church’s defined dogmas. As 
the rules of faith, these dogmas guide beliefs and practices of the faithful, showing them 
directions to experience and reflect on the traditional subjects of Christian faith such as 
Christology, Trinity, Sacraments, Mariology, etc. Through these practices of faith, the apostolic 
tradition develops in insight into the words and realities being passed on. 
 
As regards the negative heuristic of the theological program of tradition, I identify it with the 
functions of the church’s teaching office. There are two primary functions of the magisterium in 
the development of tradition. First, it protects and keeps faithfully the deposit of faith that comes 
from the apostles and those who associate with them. Second, it defines infallibly and judges 
authentically the ecclesiastical sense of faith. This faith itself is guided by the inner supernatural 
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rule, the Spirit, who is constantly working in the whole people of God and assisting its leaders. 
These leaders are appointed by God through the church to be the successors of the apostles to 
whom Christ entrusted the government of His community.74 Accordingly, the teaching office of 
the church protects the defined dogmas as well as defining and judging whether or not a 
development within the tradition is catholic and apostolic. Therefore, in the theological program 
of tradition, the growth of insight develops through Christian studies of the defined dogmas, 
through believers’ reflection and experience of spiritual realities such as liturgy and prayer as 
ways of expressing and developing the faith, and through the teaching office of the church.  
 
In her research program for theology, Murphy narrows theological data to the scriptures and the 
community’s judgments made by the discernments of spirits. Her choice of data, I think, is not 
adequate to the task of theology in the postmodern context of the church. Today we find 
ourselves equipped with new resources, and faced with new problems and possibilities as yet 
unknown. To be faithful to her identity and mission, the church has to make efforts to dialogue 
with other voices inside and outside the church.75 Accordingly, the theological task has to take 
pluralism seriously to explore the particularity and significance of Christian faith without 
reducing Christian language to an isolated language-game that neglects the global situation of 
humanity. Pluralism has philosophical, religious, social, scientific, and political implications for 
the task of theology. Therefore, we cannot do theology, or account for the development of 
tradition by means of the scriptures and the community’s judgments alone.76 The theological data 
that I propose for the scientific practical theory of tradition come from the believers’ lives of 
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faith. These data come from the intimate sense of spiritual realties which believers experience as 
well as from their contemplation and study of the church’s teachings and the scriptures in 
relation to the pluralism of theology, philosophy and the sciences in all fields of knowledge.  
 
What I have called a scientific practical theory of tradition proposes the idea that the growth of 
insight into the tradition comes from the tradition’s positive and negative heuristic. The apostolic 
tradition develops when believers continuously practice and consciously reflect on the statements 
of faith in which the apostles’ experience of revelation is expressed and passed on to those who 
associated with them. Put another way, the deposit of faith passed on from the apostles is kept, 
clarified and transformed in its meanings through the practices of faith when believers 
experience spiritual realities, study the church’s doctrines, and apply these teachings in their 
lives and new social circumstances. By means of these practices, the apostolic tradition develops 
in insight into the realities and words that are being passed on.  
 
The growth of insight in the tradition is protected and judged by the church’s teaching office, the 
negative heuristic of tradition. In the mind of many Catholics, faith is equated with adherence to 
the dogmas proclaimed by the church’s authority. However, Dei Verbum contends that the 
development of tradition first of all comes from the lives of faith, that is, from the reflection and 
experience of believers. In other words, the magisterium is only understandable as a witness to 
the continuing presence of the truths of faith revealed by the Spirit constantly working in the 
whole church. The function of the teaching office is conceivable as one aspect of the 
eschatological community of faith. It does not supervene from outside, by means of an 
authorization which is simply conceived of in juridical terms. 
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Having presented the scientific practical theory of tradition, the question that concerns us now is 
how this theory works. Can the theory I have just proposed account for the development of 
tradition in continuity with the apostolic faith, teaching, and practice? 
 
2. An Assessment of the Scientific Practical Theory of Tradition  
As I stated in the introduction of this chapter, I attempt to construct a theory that brings together 
the three ways of development of tradition according to Dei Verbum. This theory has the 
characteristics of Tilley’s theory of tradition and Murphy’s theological program. The central 
framework of the theory is a theological program of tradition that includes a core theory together 
with its auxiliary theories and theological data. Of these elements, the core theories are 
considered as irrefutable. In order to interpret the development of tradition according to the 
scientific practical theory of tradition, the following questions should be addressed. How can we 
justify the credibility of the core theories being considered as irrefutable? To what extent do the 
negative and positive heuristics of tradition clarify, protect, and transform the church’s defined 
dogmas? Another question is: Is it possible for the scientific practical theory of tradition to 
progress empirically, that is, to predict the future development of the church’s dogmas?  
 
If we put the questions regarding the core theories to Lakatos, he would recommend that at the 
beginning of their research, scientists select some of their theories, christen them as the core 
theory of their research program, and decide in advance not to reject them in the face of 
difficulties. Lakatos tells us very little on how to choose the core theories, notes his student Alan 
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Musgrave.77 All he says about the core theory of a research program is: “The actual hard core of 
a program does not actually emerge fully armed like Athena from the head of Zeus. It develops 
slowly, by a long, preliminary process of trial and error.”78 
 
In Lakatos’s view, a scientific community only accepts its core theories sometime after these 
theories are initially proposed. Lakatos himself does not consider the justification of the core as a 
significant issue. What concerns him more is the progress of empirical knowledge based on the 
harmonious operation of a research program’s components Therefore, the core theories are 
presumed as the irrefutable foundation of a scientific program. Following Lakatos, likewise, 
Murphy does not justify the core theory of her theological program. In her view, the core theory 
includes “a minimal doctrine of God, that is, the Trinitarian nature of God, God’s holiness, and 
God’s revelation in Jesus.”79 
 
Murphy’s understanding of the core theory does not work in the scientific practical theory of 
tradition. As I showed in Chapter One, the apostolic tradition is the transmission of the whole 
Christian mystery along with the interpretations of the scriptures, which are traceable to the 
apostolic communities. If we consider the core theory as a minimal doctrine of God, then the 
theological program of tradition may exclude other Christian realities that do not directly relate 
to the core theory. In my view, the defined dogmas of the church can be considered as the core 
theories of the tradition. These theories are irrefutable because they are the conscious statements 
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of faith, revealed by God, and proclaimed by the infallible teaching office of the church.  
Nevertheless, these statements are finite. Although they correspond to the realities of faith and 
point us to the mystery of God, they are unable to totally describe the apostles’ experience of 
Christ as well as the whole of the infinite realities of divine revelation. According to Rahner, in 
principle, these statements can be surpassed while retaining their truths of faith. They can be 
clarified and transformed by other statements that state the same reality. These statements offer 
not only more extensive, more delicately nuanced prospects, but also positively open up the 
divine realities implicit in the statements, which had not been seen explicitly in the earlier 
statements, and which make it possible to see the same reality from a new point of view, from a 
fresher perspective.80 
 
In order to clarify this point, I propose to distinguish between a defined dogma of the church and 
its dogmatic statements. Although a dogma is irrefutable, it may be stated in various statements 
that express its meaning with different degrees of fullness or accuracy. The irrevocability of a 
dogma does not entail the immutability of its dogmatic statements. 81 Accordingly, all dogmatic 
statements are open to adjustments, so that they may express more adequately the dogmatic 
truths that they refer to. These dogmatic truths in turn express divine revelation that passes all 
comprehension and remains hidden in the very act of its unveiling itself. Therefore, we are 
unable to fix definite limits of divine revelation to a possible reconsideration of dogmatic 
statements. 
 
Some may question how the scientific practical theory of tradition clarifies and transforms the 
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church’s dogmas considered as irrefutable. I answer this question by proposing that the dogmas 
considered as the core theories of the tradition are clarified through the relationship between the 
core theories and the positive heuristic of tradition. In other words, the positive heuristic 
functions as the studies and reflections of believers on the church’s defined dogmas. Under the 
guidance of the Spirit in new ecclesial and social circumstances, the faithful consciously 
participate in the tradition by studying the dogmas or following the rules of grammar, carrying 
out their reflection on the church’s teaching and their experience of divine realities contained in 
the scriptures and the apostolic tradition.  
 
Therefore, the development of tradition according to the scientific practical theory of tradition is 
not primarily a linear progression from one statement of faith to another in which all the logical 
consequences of each statement are gradually explicated. Rather, the development of tradition 
rests on believers’ reflections on the statements of faith heard in living contact with the reality of 
faith itself. Rahner makes clear this point by his metaphor of love. Just as in the experience of 
love, in which a person first experiences love, and then tries to articulate their experience, the 
people of God have received from the apostles not only the statements of faith about their 
experience of Jesus, but also their original experience implicit in these statements. Just as love 
grows through the always inadequate attempts to articulate and to live it, the church gradually 
grows in its self-understanding of revelation through the ongoing reflections on its present 
experience and practice in relation to the statements in which these original experiences have 
been articulated.82 Accordingly, the development of tradition involves the development of new 
articulations and practices of faith from the church’s ongoing study and reflection on its 
experience in relation to the words of God and the original experience of revelation that comes 
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from the apostles and those who associate with them. 
As I showed in Chapter One, Tilley’s theory does not explain how the apostolic tradition 
develops through the teaching authority of the bishops, who have received the sure charism of 
truth. In order to circumvent this problem, I propose to take into the scientific practical theory of 
tradition the role of the church’s teaching office. The office functions as the negative heuristic of 
tradition to make judgments whether some rules of grammar and religious practices are 
appropriate to follow. Put another way, the negative heuristic functions as an authoritative rule to 
judge whether a development within the tradition is authentic, catholic and apostolic. The 
magisterium fulfills their tasks when they listen to the voice of the Spirit constantly working in 
the theologians’ works and the believers’ religious practices. By opening their minds to dialogue 
with various voices inside and outside the church, they maintain contact with the living 
awareness of the faith, which manifests itself in the whole people of God.83 This is because the 
Spirit works in the hearts of believers as well as in the church’s teaching offices. The Spirit 
ensures from within that people down the centuries and scattered over the surface of the earth 
share the same message of salvation revealed through the life and works of Christ. 
 
From this living awareness, the church’s teaching office clarifies the church’s dogmas and 
develops the deposit of faith that reflects the faith of the whole church. When the pope together 
with a majority of the bishops arrives at a decision which is binding in faith on some open 
questions, then this decision is preserved from any error by the assistance of the Spirit.84 The 
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church’s teaching office is the bearer of faith to the extent that they are believers and hearers of 
the faith coming from the living awareness of the Spirit that constantly works in the whole 
people of God. They always preach as the members of a community of believers, and should not 
separate their teachings from the faith of believers. They assert their teachings by the fact that 
they present and clarify the content of faith understood as the genuine continuation of the faith of 
the first community of Christians constituted by and fulfilled in Christ.  
 
At this point we can return to the question I addressed at the beginning of this section, namely, is 
it possible for the scientific practical theory of tradition to progress empirically, that is, to predict 
the future development of the church’s dogmas? This question is associated with the question of 
why Murphy does not show whether her theological program has the characteristics of an 
empirical science in Part I.2. According to Murphy, a research program is considered as a 
science if occasionally it progresses empirically.85 However, she seems to imply, it is impossible 
for the program of tradition to progress empirically, or for its positive heuristic to predict the 
future development of dogmas.  
 
The problem lies in the fact that while the natural sciences seem obviously progressive through 
empirical data, theology and the theories of tradition cannot precisely predict or produce the 
empirical data of faith. For example, Newton’s laws led to the prediction of the planet Pluto, or 
quantum mechanics predicted the elusive Higgs boson. But what do the theories of tradition 
predict? Scientific theology and the theories of tradition are unable to envision the actions of the 
Spirit, which is constantly guiding the development of tradition. They cannot reasonably explain 
how the Spirit is at work in the hearts of the people of God. In science, one can trace the 
                                                     
85 Murphy, Theology in the Age of Scientific Reasoning, 59, 86-7. 
50 
 
development of Newton’s theory with increasing the amount of data from its initial appearance 
to its near unanimous acceptance within the physics community. One can further trace the 
demise of that theory in its absolute form with its replacement by Einstein’s theory of relativity. 
In theology and theories of tradition, by contrast, one cannot rationally articulate how theological 
knowledge progresses empirically in the same way that the physical sciences do.  
 
However, some might argue that the apostolic tradition develops not in terms of empirical data, 
but that of existential data – the data that help Christians understand the human relationship with 
God and the way God relates to the world. For example, a proponent of the scientific practical 
theory of tradition may argue that by applying the program of tradition to systematic theology, 
one can explain the development of theological knowledge from Nicaea to Chalcedon, from 
scholastic theology to the theologies of Luther and Calvin, and recently, the diverse branches of 
theologies in the Catholic churches before and after Vatican II. The crucial question, however, is 
whether Catholic theologies after Vatican II preserve the essence of Catholic theology before the 
Council. A church’s historian such as John O’Malley argues that there is a discontinuity between 
Catholic theology before and after Vatican II.86 Accordingly, it seems challenging to explicate 
the development of tradition in continuity with the apostolic tradition by any theory of tradition. 
In the following, nevertheless, I shall show how the scientific practical theory of tradition 
accounts for the development of tradition. 
 
3. The Concept of Continuity, Development, and the Scientific Practical Theory of 
Tradition   
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Before answering the question of how tradition develops in continuity with the apostolic faith, 
teaching and practice, I propose to explore the relation between continuity and development in 
Catholic theology. Within the purview of this chapter, I review these concepts in the theologies 
of Congar, Blondel, and Rahner. By comparison of these theologies, I hope to clarify the 
characteristics of the scientific practical theory of tradition in articulating the development and 
continuity of tradition.  
 
According to Congar, the development of tradition may simply be the unfolding of an idea 
already present in the scriptures. It may also be the development of the latent qualities of an idea 
accepted in the apostolic tradition.87 For example, the dogma of the Son being “consubstantial” 
with the Father simply clarifies an idea already contained in the Gospel of John, that is, the 
Johannine Jesus claims that the Father is in him and he is in the Father (14:10-11). The same is 
true for the dogma of the Real Presence of Christ in the Eucharist, for which the term 
“transubstantiation” has been highly relevant. However, the dogma of the Immaculate 
Conception and that of the Assumption of Mary do not appear to be the unfolding of an idea 
implicit in the scriptures and the apostolic tradition. 
 
How could a dogma that obviously appears to be a new truth be perceived to be part of the 
apostolic tradition? Regarding the Marian dogmas, we find some explanations from Congar’s 
historical theory of tradition. Congar understands the development of tradition as the 
communication from one living person to another. In the process of communication, the living 
subjects necessarily put something of themselves into what they receive. This communication 
takes place in the history of salvation. The history on its part affects the communication and its 
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content of faith, but it does not destroy the identity of what is being passed on.88 Therefore, the 
development of tradition is a historical continuity through time that flows from the past and 
reaches out to the present. It is the continuity of the past in the present. The continuity described 
here is not a simple conservation and mechanical communication of the past. It is the fidelity of 
human beings, who live in the history of salvation, who faithfully keep the words of God, and 
consciously communicate what they received to other generations. 
 
Congar’s theory partly explains the continuity and development of tradition. In the case of the 
Marian dogmas, the theory shows that the human subjects, who live in the history of salvation, 
necessarily rearticulate the faith passed on to them in their own context. Put another way, the 
faithful add something new in the process of reception without changing the identity of the 
contents of tradition. Something new here is understood as new articulations of the faith implicit 
in the scriptures and the apostolic tradition.  
 
Congar’s historical theory of tradition, nevertheless, does not give us a totally satisfactory 
account for the Marian dogmas. In my view, Blondel’s theory of tradition brings us a crucial 
insight into these dogmas. As I showed in Chapter One, Blondel criticizes historicism, which is 
closely related to a purely historical and documentary concept of tradition. He thinks that besides 
the scriptures and the dogmas, the church possesses other sources of knowledge. The church in 
her own body carries the believers’ experience of Christian mysteries motivated and directed by 
the Spirit. Therefore, tradition develops in continuity with the apostolic faith, teaching and 
practice through the synthesis between the historical transmission of written documents and the 
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present experience of believers.89 This synthesis clarifies the dogmas of the church, producing a 
profound knowledge of Christian reality that transforms the texts of the written documents with 
which it began. In other words, the continuity of tradition is not merely the mechanical 
conservation of something belonging to the past. It includes the actual and present experience of 
believers, who keep faithfully the content of tradition, and creatively pass it on under the 
guidance of the Spirit. 
 
In the case of the Marian dogmas, Blondel’s theory clarifies the role of human subjects in the 
process of reception. What he points out is that directed and guided by the Spirit the believers’ 
present experience of faith in relation to the written documents produces a profound knowledge 
of Christian reality that transforms the documents themselves. The believers’ experience of faith 
confirms the church’s teaching office that a new truth of Christian reality, such as the Marian 
dogmas, comes out of the totality of the deposit of faith that originated from the experience of 
the apostles.  
 
In his theology of dogmas, Rahner further articulates the meaning of believers’ experience in 
relation to the development of tradition. In the same line of thought as Congar and Blondel, 
Rahner views tradition as a process of handing on the faith.90 It is the transmission of believers’ 
experience expressed in written documents and practices from one community to another. The 
community’s experience rests on the experience of the apostles and develops their heritage of 
faith, which has a historical root and cannot continue to develop if it separates from the 
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connection with the apostles.91 The apostles themselves experienced the life and work of Jesus, 
whom they saw with their eyes and touched with their hands. As the objective content of the 
apostles’ experience, the life and work of Jesus were simpler, yet richer than any individual 
statement coined by the apostles and those who associated with them to express this original 
experience.92  
 
Because the apostles can only pass on their reflexive explication of faith in propositional form, 
and not their experience itself, in every generation after them, only a logical connection between 
implicit and explicit propositions could support the possibility of further development of 
dogmas.93 In other words, the apostles’ experience of Christian mystery cannot be translated 
adequately and objectively into the propositions of faith.94 Therefore, the development of 
tradition in continuity with the apostolic faith involves the development of new articulations of 
faith from the church’s ongoing experience and reflection on the scriptures and the teachings 
received from the apostles and those who associated with them. Such development is legitimate 
because the new propositions connect to the already possessed experience of the apostles. This 
process of continuing to experience and reflecting on the words of God of the whole church 
under the guidance of the Spirit reasonably account for the appearance of the Marian dogmas.  
 
In summary, the continuity of tradition involves the development of new articulations of faith 
that comes from the whole church’s ongoing experience and reflection on the church’s dogmas 
and the scriptures. This development can be understood as the result of the synthesis between the 
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historical transmission of written documents and the present experience of believers, who keep 
faithfully the words of God and transmit them creatively into another generation. Having 
described the meanings of the development and continuity of tradition in the theologies of 
Congar, Rahner, and Blondel, I shall now show how the scientific practical theory of tradition 
explains the development of tradition.  
 
The scientific practical theory of tradition attempts to bring together the dynamics of Congar’s, 
Blondel’s, and Rahner’s theories of tradition. It considers the development of tradition as the 
expanding of a network of theories, whose core theories remain the same in the course of its 
development, while the auxiliary theories are continuously formulated to further clarify the 
meaning of the core theories, or rather to simplify their meanings, and creatively pass them on 
from one community of believers to another. This network of theories is articulated and 
developed through the practices of believers, who consciously follow the tradition’s rules of 
grammar to study the church’s doctrines and the scriptures, to experience Christian realities such 
as the sacraments and prayers in their social contexts, and to rearticulate the statements of faith 
that come from their present experience in relation to the original experience of the apostles. 
Accordingly, there exists a reciprocal relationship between actions and words, between practices 
of faith and written documents, between the core theories and their auxiliary theories in the 
development of tradition under the guidance of the Spirit.  
 
Put another way, the development of tradition can be expressed in the two following manners. 
Individual propositions of faith or the church’s dogmas and the scriptures are gradually grasped, 
clarified, and transformed by the studies and present experience of communities of believers, 
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who faithfully follow the tradition’s rules of grammar. These practices of faith lead, on the one 
hand, to ever increasing articulation of the fullness of the apostles’ original experience passed on 
in the form of dogmas and in the scriptures. On the other hand, because all statements are 
rearticulated in the living contact of believers with divine revelation itself, these practices result 
in a process of returning into the mystery of divine revelation, in order to further clarify the 
statements of faith.   
 
In this process of development, the continuity of tradition manifests through the continuity of the 
tradition’s core theories, through the development of new articulations of faith from the church’s 
ongoing experience and reflection on the scriptures and the church’s defined dogmas. On the 
other hand, the scientific practical theory of tradition explains the development of tradition in 
continuity with the apostolic faith, teachings and practices through the life of faith of community 
of believers. In the face of contextual changes, these communities continue to keep and develop 
the apostolic tradition by studying the written documents and the church’s dogmas to clarify, 
conceptualize, and newly express the realities of Christian faith. Accordingly, the statements of 
faith implicit or explicit in the tradition must change and develop to be understood, experienced, 
and lived by the present communities of Christ’s disciples. The continuity of tradition is also 
reflected through the church’s teaching office. The magisterium listens to the experience and 
study of believers, keeping the deposit of faith by judging whether a development within the 
tradition is in continuity with the apostolic tradition. In the process of transmission, the Spirit 
works in the whole people of God to ensure from within that the truths of faith are faithfully 
preserved, creatively passed on, and transform the lives of believers.  
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Conclusion  
The present chapter attempts to offer a more comprehensive account of the development of 
tradition according to Dei Verbum, calling it a scientific practical theory of tradition. This theory 
draws the insights from Murphy’s research program for theology, Lakatos’s theory of scientific 
progress, and Tilley’s practical theory of tradition. In applying this theory to interpret the 
development of tradition, I showed the extent to which it explains the development of tradition in 
continuity with the apostolic faith, teaching, and practice. At the heart of the theory is a 
theological program of tradition composed of the core theories along with their negative and 
positive heuristic. 
 
The tradition develops in continuity with the apostolic faith, teaching, and practice when the 
negative and positive heuristic are continuously formulated to protect the core theories from 
being falsified and further articulate the meaning of the core. In this process of development, the 
continuity of tradition manifests through the continuity of the tradition’s core theories, through 
the teaching of the magisterium, and through the development of new articulations of faith from 
the church’s ongoing experience and reflection on the scriptures and the church’s defined 
dogmas. In other words, the scientific practical theory of tradition explains the development of 
tradition through the community of believers’ life of faith. In the face of contextual changes, this 
community keeps faithfully and creatively develops the apostolic tradition when they experience 
the spiritual realities through prayers and the sacraments, study the scriptures and the church’s 
dogmas, and follow the teachings of the bishops to clarify, conceptualize, and newly express the 
realities of Christian faith.  
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Locating the chapter in the context of the whole thesis, we see that it answers the second 
question that I addressed in the Introduction, namely, how tradition develops in continuity with 
the apostolic faith, teaching and practice. The previous chapter argues that Tilley’s practical 
theory of tradition reasonably accounts for the first two ways in which the apostolic tradition 
develops according to Dei Verbum. In the following chapter, I take Tilley’s proposal for the 
Catholic Intellectual Tradition as a case study, showing how the scientific practical theory of 
tradition that I have just constructed provides an analysis of the development of Catholic 
Intellectual Tradition.  
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Chapter III: A Proposal for the Development of Catholic Intellectual Tradition  
Having interpreted the development of tradition in Chapter One, and presented the scientific 
practical theory of tradition in Chapter Two, in this chapter the issue I address is how Dei 
Verbum’s teaching on the development of tradition and the scientific practical theory of tradition 
give us some insights into the development of Catholic Intellectual Tradition (CIT). As I showed 
in Chapter One, Tilley argues that we can recognize and understand a tradition by studying its 
rules of grammar. He tests his theory by proposing five rules of grammar that for him 
characterize the CIT. These rules emerge from the practices undertaken which constitute the 
tradition. They are (1) the analogical imagination, characterized by “both/and” thinking, a 
sacramental universe, and Catholic belief in the Incarnation; (2) a universal hope; (3) an 
inclusive community; (4) the church as sacramental, and thereby public in nature; and (5) a 
gracious God as the source of all good things.95  
 
According to Tilley, these rules are not explicitly doctrinal, nor are they restricted to explicitly 
religious practices. Rather, they express the general principles by which Catholics view God, the 
human person, the church, and the world.96 He considers the rules as the first stage of his larger 
project of writing a complete grammar of CIT. Tilley’s project is an ambitious one. However, it 
neither shows us how the tradition develops through its rules of grammar, nor does it 
successfully deal with conflicts within the tradition in the postmodern context of the church. To 
further Tilley’s project, I propose to construct the CIT according to the scientific practical theory 
of tradition, showing how this theory accounts for the development of tradition. To facilitate the 
argument, I shall first review Tilley’s theory of tradition as presented in Chapter One. Then I 
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explain why his theory fails to explain the development of CIT in a way consonant with Dei 
Verbum. Having done so, I apply the scientific practical theory of tradition to make a proposal 
for the development of CIT.  
 
Part I: Tilley’s Theory of Tradition and a Critique of His Theory 
I.1. Tilley’s Practical Theory of Tradition  
In way similar to Congar, Blondel and Rahner, Tilley understands the concept of tradition not 
only as contents to be handed on, but also as a communicative process from one group of persons 
to another group. However, unlike Congar and Rahner, Tilley “brackets” the relation of tradition 
to divine revelation, and discusses the meaning of tradition in descriptive terms.97 In other words, 
he philosophizes on the social process of tradition, giving a descriptive account of the way in 
which the historical life of a community actually hands on the contents of tradition. Then he uses 
this view of tradition to conceptualize the Catholic tradition. Tilley’s method highlights some 
advantages in his theory of tradition. Nevertheless, it shows some limitations that I shall point 
out in the next section. 
 
In concrete terms, Tilley considers a tradition as an ongoing set of practices constantly being 
invented and reinvented by a community of practitioners when that tradition faces contextual 
changes. Accordingly, an actual living tradition is changeable by its very nature. It is not a 
“thing” with a definite “essence” objectively observed by analysts, or simply participated in by a 
group of participants. Like Möhler’s and Blondel’s theories of tradition, Tilley views traditions 
as living organisms which through practices of their participants adapt themselves to their 
environments, in order to faithfully pass on their contents from one generation to another. 
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Tradition shapes the beliefs, behaviors, and attitudes of those who participate in the practices of 
tradition. It is then reshaped by the very process of reception and the further transmission of the 
contents of tradition. 
 
As I showed in Chapter One, Tilley constructs his theory of tradition by combining 
Wittgenstein’s concept of grammar with McClendon’s view of practice. He argues that tradition 
is a set of enduring practices shaping the identity of a group of persons, who live in and out of 
that tradition.98 These persons then reshape and transmit the received contents of tradition when 
they practice or follow the tradition’s rules of grammar. For example, Tilley identifies the 
Catholic Intellectual Tradition by proposing the five rules of grammar that I mentioned above. 
These rules are used not only to characterize the tradition, but also to distinguish whether a work 
of literature or a practice of faith belongs to the Catholic tradition. One thus can comprehend a 
tradition by studying its rules of grammar as well as how these rules are applied in practices. Just 
as grammars are guidelines for those who study a language, rules are the guidelines for those 
who want to participate in a set of practices of a tradition. These rules might be malleable and 
variously applied. However, they also provide “negative” principles for a person to recognize, 
study, and participate in a tradition.99  
 
Tilley claims that his theory is compatible with the post-critical realist fundamental theology of 
revelation presented by Avery Dulles in Models of Revelation.100 In addition, the rule-ordered set 
of practices that constitutes a tradition is not founded on some authority external to the tradition, 
but on the authority that “arises in the relationships between the practitioners who seek the ends 
                                                     
98 Ibid., 57, 79. 
99 Ibid., 122. 
100 Avery Dulles, Models of Revelation (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis, 1992). 
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that the practice makes it possible to reach.”101 In short, Tilley’s practical theory of tradition is 
rich and insightful. He shows the community of Catholic theologians a distinctive way to view 
the concept of tradition in terms of practices or following the rules of grammar. His effort of 
spelling out the five rules/principles of CIT is highly appreciated. Nevertheless, the three 
following criticisms come to my mind as I ponder on Tilley’s approach to the concept of 
tradition. The criticisms do not diminish my appreciation for his theory. They represent just one 
way among others to further our conversation about his promising project.  
 
I.2. A Critique of Tilley’s Theory of Tradition  
My first critique of Tilley’s theory regards the method he uses to construct the practical theory of 
tradition. Evidently, he does not build up the theory with doctrinal statements claimed by the 
church’s teaching office, nor does he construct the theory based on historical research into the 
development of Catholic theologies of tradition, as Jan Walgrave and John Thiel do.102 Using 
sociological and philosophical categories, Tilley “brackets” traditional understanding of the 
relation between tradition and divine revelation. He attempts to describe the meaning of tradition 
in a social manner, and then use that approach to examine the Catholic tradition. Such a view of 
tradition makes the Catholic tradition philosophically and sociologically understood. However, 
Tilley’s challenge is to show how a religious tradition grounded on divine revelation differs from 
other traditions that are not religious.  
 
Facing this criticism, Tilley argues that unlike other traditions, a religious tradition has “a shared 
vision” that guides the practices of its believers. He understands this shared vision as “a web of 
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102 Jan H. Walgrave, Unfolding Revelation (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1972), and John Thiel, Senses of Tradition 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
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conviction.” The web not only expresses the goal of practices, but also integrates the means used 
in practices to their goal.103 By “a web of conviction” Tilley means those persistent beliefs 
strongly held by a community of practitioners. If they are given up, then the character of the 
community is significantly changed.104 Tilley’s articulation of the religious shared vision is 
comprehensive, insightful, and reasonable. However, my question is, in what sense this vision 
relates to the rules of grammar proposed by diverse groups of participants within the Catholic 
tradition. For example, if we analyze the mechanics of CIT, we may question how the CIT’s 
vision relates to the five rules of grammar as suggested by Tilley. Can we consider one of these 
rules the vision of CIT? I leave these questions for a moment, and shall return to them in my 
application of the scientific practical theory of tradition to explore the development of CIT.  
 
Secondly, what are the criteria by which Tilley chooses for himself the five rules of CIT? Tilley 
notes that these rules are not constituted by the church’s teaching authority, nor by Catholic 
intellectuals, and nor by Catholic religious practices.105 If that is the case, how do we know that 
these rules are the appropriate rules to follow? Furthermore, given the disagreements and 
conflicts among diverse groups within the Catholic tradition regarding different practices and 
rules to follow, how can a group of practitioners judge whether the rules they are following are 
normative and operative. Tilley answers this objection by appealing to appropriate practices 
among expert practitioners from whom we learn the skills of acting and judgments according to 
the practices of a tradition. Recognizing such appropriate practices, he states, is like getting a 
joke.106 We either get the joke or not. We either recognize in the exemplars that this is the way 
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we do things or we do not.  
 
Tilley’s argument is fair in the sense that we know how to follow a rule when we look at the 
appropriate practices of experts within a tradition. However, the problem that he may need to 
address further is the diversity of appropriate practices in the context of pluralism that our church 
has to face at the present. If we take into account the statements of Karl Rahner,107 David 
Tracy,108 Alasdair MacIntyre,109 and many others that have constantly reminded us about the 
uncontrollable pluralism of philosophy, theology, science, and other fields of knowledge in the 
contemporary context of the church, then Tilley’s appeal to exemplary practitioners does not 
settle the disagreements between a set of practices held by a group of practitioners, and another 
set held by a different group within the same Catholic tradition. In light of the fact that many 
practices of a group of practitioners from time to time in the church’s history contradicted a set 
of rules followed by another group, which criteria should one group follow to choose the rules 
that guide their practices of faith?  
 
The key issue here is by which criteria one recognizes a proposed development of tradition as 
authentic, catholic, and apostolic. Without appealing to authoritative criteria to interpret and 
judge diverse practices within the Catholic tradition, we are unable to settle conflicts and 
disagreements over the practices and rules to follow among different groups of practitioners. I 
agree with Elizabeth Johnson’s judgment in her review of Tilley’s theory when she requires: 
                                                     
107 See the following articles of Karl Rahner in his Theological Investigations: “Philosophy and Philosophising in 
Theology,” “On the Theology of Ecumenical Discussion,” “Reflection on Methodology in Theology,” “On the 
Current Relationship between Theology and Philosophy,” “The Future of Theology,” and “Yesterday’s History of 
Dogma and Theology for Tomorrow.”  
108 David Tracy, The Analogical Imagination: Christian Theology and the Culture of Pluralism (New York: Crossroad, 
1981), and Plurality and Ambiguity: Hermeneutics, Religion, Hope (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1987).  
109 Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988).  
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“Addressing conflict as a component of the practice of handing on tradition would strengthen 
Tilley’s account of practice, and give some place in theory for such tensions to dwell.”110 These 
conflicts within the Catholic tradition are only solved if we have authoritative criteria, in order to 
judge whether a set of practices is to be followed or an authentic development of tradition should 
be accepted.  
 
At this point we come to appreciate the key to the development of tradition as identified by Dei 
Verbum, namely, the teachings of the bishops considered as an authoritative criterion to interpret 
the development of tradition. The issue that I mentioned above regarding the uncontrollable 
pluralism of the practices of faith can be settled if we take into Tilley’s theory the role of the 
church’s teaching offices, in order to judge whether some religious practices or the rules of 
grammar are appropriate to follow. Tilley does not consider the role of the magisterium in his 
theory of tradition. Therefore, his theory cannot deal with conflicts among different practices and 
rules to follow within the Catholic tradition. It does not explain how the Catholic tradition 
develops in insights into realities and words through the teaching authority of the bishops, who 
keep faithfully the deposit of faith, judge genuinely the development of doctrine, and collectively 
define the faith of the church.111 
 
Tilley may object to the above argument, saying that the inclusion of the magisterium as a CIT’s 
rule of grammar would exclude much literature that strike him as obviously Catholic, for 
example, most of the stories in the Breslin collection and the works of Graham Greene.112 The 
point at stake here is perhaps the nature, the characteristics, and the development of CIT. If one 
                                                     
110 Elizabeth Johnson, “Four Perspectives on Inventing Catholic Tradition,” Horizons, 28 (2001), 113. 
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agrees with Tilley and excludes the church’s teaching office as a guiding principle of CIT, then 
the tradition will be set free to develop its contents and practices to the extent that a work of 
literature or a practice of faith explicitly follows the five rules of grammar. Accordingly, that a 
project, a work of literature, or a practice of faith belongs to the CIT is strictly judged in 
accordance with whether they follow the rules of grammar. Put another way, the rules of 
grammar themselves regulate literature and determine whether that work or practice belongs to 
the Catholic Intellectual Tradition.  
 
If one disagrees with Tilley and expands the rules of grammar to include the church’s teaching 
office as the sixth rule of CIT, then the magisterium may be considered as a guiding principle, in 
order to direct the development of CIT as well as judging in some circumstances whether a work 
of literature or a religious practice within the tradition is catholic and apostolic. In my view, 
Tilley’s five rules of grammar do not show how a work or a practice belonging to the CIT is 
continuous with Catholic faith and its heritage. Given the postmodern context of the church with 
diverse practices and rules to follow, the church’s teaching office may be considered as a rule of 
grammar, in order to guide the development of CIT, especially the development of Catholic 
theology and Catholic higher education.  
 
Thirdly, when we examine the five rules of grammar as proposed by Tilley, it is unclear how 
these rules work together to explain the development of CIT. In his theory of tradition, Tilley 
does not show the relationship among the CIT’s rules of grammar. What he proposes are only the 
five rules of grammar that characterize the tradition. Of the five rules, I would argue that the 
principle of a gracious God can be utilized as a foundational vision of what the CIT seeks to 
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embody, and that the principle of “this is what God is like” has much to do with a final 
justification and shaping of Catholic practices as does “this is what we do.” In order to show how 
the tradition’s rules of grammar work together, I articulate in the following the development of 
CIT according to the scientific practical theory of tradition.  
 
Part II: The Development of Catholic Intellectual Tradition  
Before analyzing the development of CIT, it is necessary for my purpose here to construct the 
tradition according to the framework of the scientific practical theory of tradition (SPT). In order 
to do so, I shall first present the concept of CIT as it is articulated in the contemporary literature. 
What follows is intended to serve as a starting point for a conversation about the nature, the 
characteristics, and the development of CIT.  
 
II.1. Constructing the Catholic Intellectual Tradition 
As I showed in the introduction to this chapter, Tilley proposes five rules of grammar to 
recognize and understand the CIT. His understanding of the tradition, in my view, is not only 
abstract, but also unable to explain how this tradition develops in insights into the realties and 
words. To understand tradition more concretely, I follow Monika Hellwig and view it in terms of 
two aspects. First, the CIT can be considered as “a heritage,” that is, a treasury of classic and 
more contemporary works, including intellectual, religious, and aesthetic products by a variety of 
creative persons in the course of history. Second, it is a “way of living/doing things,” or rather a 
way of proceeding “to deal with experience and knowledge in order to acquire true wisdom, live 
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well, and build good societies, laws and customs.”113 
 
Tilley’s and Hellwig’s understandings of CIT, nevertheless, cannot totally get hold of the 
concept of CIT. This tradition contains a vast repository of theological thought, philosophizing, 
devotional practices, works of literature, visual art, music, styles of architecture, social and 
political theorizing, and other forms of cultural expression that have emerged in vastly different 
parts of the world in the course of more than 2,000 years of Christian religious experience. Is it 
possible for us to synthesize the meaning of this vast archive, sum up its rules of grammar, and 
make them relevant to the contemporary intellectual life in a way that would justify speaking of a 
tradition? What roles should this tradition play in the post-modern context of the church, 
especially in the development of Catholic theology and Catholic higher education? 
 
Despite the complexity of CIT, if we simplify the tradition in terms of its principles, then we can 
construct and envision the way that it develops according to the SPT. This tradition can be 
viewed as a network of interlinked theories that includes core theories, auxiliary theories around 
the core, and a body of data. Of these components, the core theories constitute the central 
framework of CIT. These theories must be kept in the course of tradition’s development. 
Otherwise, the character of tradition will be significantly changed. Of Tilley’s five rules of 
grammar, I propose to consider the principle of a gracious God as the CIT’s core theory. Some 
will immediately question the criteria that I use to justify this principle as the core theory. Why is 
this principle and not others chosen as the core theory? How does the core theory relate to the 
other principles of CIT as well as to the Catholic heritage as mentioned by Hellwig?  
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As I showed in Chapter Two, Lakatos recommends that at the beginning of their research, a 
community of scientists selects some of their theories, christens them the core theories of their 
research program, and consciously decides in advance not to modify or renounce them in the 
face of anomalies. In Lakatos’s view, a scientific community only accepts “an actual hard core” 
sometime after the core theory is initially proposed. He does not consider the justification of the 
core theory as a significant issue. The core theory for him is presumed as an irrefutable 
foundation of a research program.114  
 
In line with Lakatos’s view of the core theory, I consider the principle of a gracious God as the 
core theory of CIT. Like a core theory of a scientific program, this principle develops gradually 
through a long process of debates and communal discernments of spirits in the Catholic tradition. 
On the one hand, the principle can be tested according to O’Collins’s criteria that I mentioned in 
Chapter One.115 Following the church’s doctrines and the scriptures, most Catholics everywhere 
and always believe that the God of Jesus Christ is a gracious One, who is the source and the 
Creator of all good things. On the other hand, the principle shows a distinctive characteristic of 
the Catholic view of God in comparison to other traditions.  
 
For example, in the Calvinist tradition, Christ died only for the elect as solemnly declared by the 
Synod of Dort (1618). The bondage of a person to sin is the result of Adam’s fall, and that 
bondage is the immutable will of God.116 By contrast, Catholics firmly believe, as the Council of 
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116 See John Dillenberger and Claude Welch, Protestant Christianity: Interpreted through its Development (New 
York: Macmillan, 1988), 83-6. 
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Florence (1439) taught, that “all creatures are good because they were made by the Supreme 
Good … there is no such thing as a nature of evil, because every nature insofar as it is a nature is 
good.”117 Accordingly, in Catholic theology and tradition, a person’s bondage to sin is not due to 
the immutable will of God. The sins that we committed are the result of the mutability of finite 
creatures.  
 
Another reason to consider the principle of a gracious God as the CIT’s core theory is its 
capacity to interlink with the other rules and to develop the contents of tradition. For example, 
we can see how tradition, together with its core theory of a gracious God, functions in the 
theology of Rahner. Arguably, at the heart of Rahner’s theology is the theology of a gracious 
God, who existentially and historically communicates Himself in forgiving love to all human 
beings. Rahner argues that through this prior offer of God’s self-communication as “the 
supernatural existential,” human nature has been transformed and elevated by grace.118 By this 
he means that in the very act of creating, the gracious God has freely offered Himself to us 
whether we open ourselves to receive this Gift or not. Through the self-offering of God, we 
realize ourselves as historical and existential beings saved by the love of God.  
 
This self-communication should not be considered as static or as a thing to be grasped by 
humankind, but as the key to the becoming of the world and to the transcendence of human 
beings. The more we reach out toward a gracious God and receive His unmerited gift of grace, 
the more we are caught up in the mystery of human existence and the mystery of God. In other 
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words, God’s self-communication is always implicitly present in human nature as the prior 
condition of possibility for our acceptance of God’s grace. Through this self-communication of 
God, we are capable of reaching out towards the Absolute Being, who is the foundation and the 
source of all human knowledge, will and goodness.  
 
Among other theories in his systematic theology, Rahner places the principle of a gracious God 
at the center of his network of intricate theories. This principle functions as a foundational vision 
that allows Rahner to construct his anthropological project, his theology of grace, his theology of 
hope, etc., as they are the concrete expressions of the principle of a gracious God. Rahner’s 
theology, therefore, offers an example of how the CIT works according to the scientific practical 
theory of tradition. In the following, I further clarify the relation between the tradition’s core 
theory and its auxiliary theories.  
 
In the scientific practical theory of tradition, the core theory cannot stand alone. It is conjoined 
by a protective belt of auxiliary theories that function as the positive and negative heuristic of 
tradition. The positive heuristic consists of a set of theories on how to clarify and transform the 
meaning of the core theory, while the negative heuristic is a set of theories protecting the core by 
deflecting criticisms to the protective belt of auxiliary theories. As regards the CIT, the following 
principles can function as its positive heuristics: a universal hope, an inclusive community, and 
the church as sacramental. In my view, these principles are “rich” theories that enable Catholic 
intellectuals, theologians, and believers to expand the network of knowledge along with their 
practices of faith in relation to the core theory of a gracious God. They suggest the ways to 
develop the Catholic tradition, clarifying and transforming the meaning of Catholic teachings in 
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relation to the pluralism of theology, philosophy, and scientific theories in all fields of 
knowledge. Meanwhile, together with the church’s teaching office as a rule of grammar, the 
analogical imagination functions as the negative heuristic of CIT, in order to protect the core 
theory and guide the development of tradition.  
 
We see how these rules of grammar work together by examining Elizabeth Johnson’s critique of 
Tilley’s proposal for the CIT. Johnson argues that Tilley should consider the role of conflict in 
the practice of handing on the tradition. Appealing to the fact that Tilley’s rule 3, an inclusive 
community, contradicted the contemporary experience of women, gays and lesbians, divorced 
and remarried persons in the contemporary church, she urges Catholic theologians and 
intellectuals to address conflicts as a necessary component of the practice of handing on 
tradition.119Another example that she takes relates to the falsification of Tilley’s rule 5, namely, a 
gracious God. Johnson notes that before Vatican II the Irish churches in New York, where she 
grew up, were marked by a strong sense of a distant God at whose judgments one should quake. 
Was the principle of a gracious God not operating within the tradition at that time, asks 
Johnson?120  
 
In Catholic theology and Catholic tradition, the principle of a gracious God functions explicitly 
or implicitly as a foundational theory incorporated into systematic theology. Therefore, we can 
protect this core theory against Johnson’s and other critiques by showing that the God of Jesus – 
if we understand him correctly – is not a distant God. For example, through the image of Christ 
as God’s Real-Symbol, one recognizes that the God of Christ, who became a human in the person 
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of Jesus, is a loving and gracious God.121  Put simply, the argument here is that one can keep the 
core theory, and further develop the CIT by seeking theories functioning as the negative and 
positive heuristic available in systematic theology, biblical theology, pastoral theology, and all 
other fields of knowledge to modify and drive away Johnson’s or any other critique of the CIT’s 
principle of a gracious God. With the help of these auxiliary theories, the tradition’s core theory 
and the living faith of Catholic community are not only saved from falsification, but are also 
capable of developing a more systematic account of the humanity and the mystery of God.  
 
Some may object to the above argument, saying that though the scientific practical theory of 
tradition defends the CIT and rejects alternative theologies that cast doubt on the core theory of a 
gracious God, how does the tradition develop in the face of poor practices, such as those cited by 
Johnson? Are we naïve in proposing a more nuanced theory of tradition that saves the tradition 
from distorted practices, or rather from the human capacity to mess up? What role could the 
Spirit work in the development of tradition? Does the development of tradition need some 
structural supports from outside the church? In the following, I attempt to answer these questions 
and articulate the development of CIT within the framework of the scientific practical theory of 
tradition.  
 
II.2. The Development of Catholic Intellectual Tradition 
The first question that I address is: How does the tradition develop in the face of poor practices 
as mentioned by Johnson? One of these practices, namely, believers’ false belief about a distant 
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of Modern Man’s Understanding of Himself and of His World,” “Brief Observations on Systematic Christology 
Today,” and “The Two Basic Types of Christology.”  
74 
 
God, challenges the principle of a gracious God. In accordance with the scientific practical 
theory of tradition, we may deal with this problem by studying the believers’ experience of God 
at that time in New York. Finding out what factors affected their religious belief and practices of 
faith would enable the church’s teaching office to engage in dialogue and to guide the faith of 
believers. The office carries out its task by showing the faithful that the God of Jesus is not a 
distant God. This task can be fulfilled by implementing a more effective catechesis that helps 
believers understand the image of God in a more sophisticated and dynamic way.  
 
In my view, we are unable to avoid distorted practices and false beliefs intruding into the 
practices of a community of believers when that community, together with the contents of 
tradition that it inherits, faces contextual changes. Nevertheless, within the Catholic tradition, 
one should be optimistic in believing that the CIT’s negative heuristic can save the tradition from 
these false beliefs and practices. We have reasons to do so because Catholics firmly believe that 
the Spirit of Christ is constantly working in the hearts of believers and in the church’s teaching 
office. The Spirit unites its people through all ages, through the diversity of culture, and through 
different social backgrounds. More importantly, the Spirit guides the faith of the whole church, 
directing us and giving us hope towards an eschatological future. Accordingly, we can count on 
the negative heuristic of CIT, that is, the analogical imagination of Catholics and the church’s 
teaching office, in order to guide and direct the development of tradition.  
 
Tilley’s five rules of grammar alone are unable to save the tradition from human distortion. As I 
stated in Chapter One, divine revelation, Christian faith, and everything that they encompass 
such as the Creed, the church’s doctrines, and the scriptures, etc., are beyond the natural 
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endowments of our cognitive and affective capacity to understand. Any theory of development 
that limits its sources and methods to our reason, rules of grammar, and human will alone or any 
other non-graced power of our embodied spirits is inadequate to account for the development of 
tradition. Therefore, believing that the Spirit constantly works in the faithful and in the 
magisterium, our tradition needs the guidance of the teaching office as the sixth rule of grammar 
to unite the body with its head, the teaching church with the rest of the people of God.  
 
In light of the above, we can imagine that the development of CIT as the community of believers 
follows the rules of grammar to study Christian doctrines, expanding the network of theories or 
Catholic treasury together with its practices of faith in relation to the core theory of a gracious 
God. As I have proposed, the principles of a universal hope, an inclusive community, and the 
church as sacramental can function as the positive heuristic of tradition, in order to further 
articulate the meaning of the core theory and to expand the network of knowledge. These 
principles suggest the ways to develop the Catholic tradition, clarifying the principle of a 
gracious God in relation to the pluralism of theology, philosophy, and scientific theories in all 
fields of knowledge. Meanwhile, the analogical imagination and the church’s teaching office 
may function as the negative heuristic of tradition, in order to protect the core theory and guide 
the development of tradition.  
 
One may challenge my argument here, questioning in what sense the teaching church and the 
analogical imagination protect the core theory as well as guiding the development of tradition. 
Should the tradition progress according to the rules of grammar alone? In order to clarify the role 
of negative heuristic, I propose to make clear the meaning of analogical imagination, bringing 
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into account the concept of dialogue between the faithful and the church’s teaching office 
regarding the truths of Christian reality.  
 
According to Tilley, the analogical imagination characterizes the way of Catholic thinking in 
relation to the world in which we are living.122 This thinking seeks the similarities and the unities 
that exist among events, entities, or states of affairs that seem different. Tilley describes three 
general characteristics of the analogical imagination. The first is to treat dilemmas or paired 
types as the both/and in contrast to the either/or of the dialectical imagination. The second is that 
Catholics live in a sacramental universe. They view everything in the world as having the sacred 
origins and created by a gracious God. The third is Catholic belief in the Incarnation. Unlike 
some Protestant thinkers such as Soren Kierkegaard, who emphasizes the radical paradox of the 
Incarnation – the Infinite become finite, or Thomas Morris, who attempts to show that the 
Incarnation is not a logical impossibility,123 “Catholics take the event of the Incarnation for 
granted. They don’t tend to respond with Kierkegaardian angst or a Morrisian exposition of 
logical possibilities.”124 
 
Tilley’s concept of the analogical imagination is quite similar to Hellwig’s way of proceeding. 
Both Tilley and Hellwig mention the way of thinking and living that characterize believers who 
are Catholics. In viewing the analogical imagination of believers and the teaching office of the 
church as the negative heuristic of tradition, I think of an ongoing dialogue between the 
hierarchical magisterium and the faithful, which is considered as the momentum of development 
of tradition. This dialogue attempts to find answers to the dilemmas by means of the both/and 
                                                     
122 Tilley, Inventing Catholic Tradition, 125-34. 
123 Thomas Morris, The Logic of God Incarnate (Ithaca: N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986), 204. 
124 Tilley, Inventing Catholic Tradition, 132. 
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solution, seeking the similarities and the unities that exist among conflicting entities or states of 
affairs in the church and in the world. By doing so, the faithful together with the magisterium are 
actively keeping the tradition, consciously handing on the received contents of tradition, and 
creatively inventing tradition to rearticulate the faith when tradition faces contextual changes. 
However, given their independent activities and the mutuality between the magisterium and the 
faithful in the process of dialogue, how does the teaching office function in guiding believers’ 
faith and the development of tradition? The key to an answer is perhaps found in John 
Burkhard’s concept of representation.125 A representative is the personification of the entire 
community, that is, the incorporation in his/her person of the community. As qualified witnesses, 
the hierarchy meets this function of representation of Christian truths in a particular way, 
fulfilling their function that pertains to the membership as a whole, yet without excluding the 
others.126 
 
In the concrete, although all believers are the recipients of faith and witness to its truth claims, 
only the teaching office of the church does so “representatively” with a clarity, a directness, and 
an authority that theologians and the rest of the faithful in the church lack to do. Accordingly, we 
need the teaching church that functions as guarding the faith of the community, mediating its 
contents through the practices of Christian life, excluding distorted practices by exercising 
supervision over the church’s statements of faith, and promoting authentic Christian living 
within the post-modern context of the church. In the development of tradition, the office might 
not add something new to the Catholic treasury, but they must help to keep faithfully and 
interpret authentically the contents of faith for the community of believers. 
                                                     
125 John Burkhard, “The Sensus Fidelium,” in The Routledge Companion to the Christian Church, edited by Gerard 
Mannion and Lewis Mudge (London: Routledge, 2008), 560-75. 
126 Burkhard, “The Sensus Fidelium,” 568.  
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Another way to envision the development of CIT is through the relationship between the core 
theory and the positive heuristic of tradition. According to the scientific practical theory of 
tradition, the positive heuristic functions as Christian studies and reflections on the church’s 
defined dogmas. As the rules of faith, these dogmas guide beliefs and practices of believers, 
showing them directions to experience and reflect on the traditional subjects of Christian faith. 
Through these practices of faith, the tradition develops in insight into the words and realities 
being passed on. Applying this understanding of the positive heuristic to CIT, we can consider 
the positive heuristic as the works of theologians and Catholic intellectuals in their 
interpretations of the rules of grammar. For example, theologians can give a theological account 
of the church as sacramental, showing how this account helps us further understand the principle 
of a gracious God. This rule of grammar when well articulated and integrated with other fields of 
knowledge will point beyond themselves to the mystery of a transcendent and gracious God, who 
loves us through the Word made flesh.  
 
In the process of developing the CIT, I think that we have to be creatively faithful. By this I 
mean, on the one hand, that we have to keep the tradition’s identity and preserve in itself the 
treasury of the past tradition. On the other hand, for the sake of its development, we must adapt 
the contents of tradition into the contemporary world, face new challenges, and take up 
opportunities to develop its network of knowledge as well as creatively passing on the practices 
that we have been received. To be creatively faithful, we have to penetrate to the meaning of 
tradition, clarify its rules of grammar, and creatively rearticulate the contents of tradition in the 
face of contextual changes.  
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In my view, only such a fidelity to the tradition is able to facilitate the development of CIT. 
Often one thinks that they are faithful to a tradition when they hold and keep the past contents of 
tradition, that is, the received ideas, practices, and customs. That way of thinking and living, 
however, is not relevant to the development of tradition according to Dei Verbum. In order to 
represent the tradition authentically, keeping it faithfully, and developing it creatively, one must 
be acutely sensitive to the current situation, reading the signs of the time, participating in the 
tradition’s rules of grammar, presenting the meanings of tradition in a broader perspective, that 
is, in their relations to the pluralism of all field of knowledge. By doing so, one lives in and out 
the tradition, thereby contributes to it, and creatively passes it on to another generation under the 
guidance of the Spirit. 
 
As far as I now see in my proposal for the development of CIT, there are at least two problems if 
we develop the tradition according to the framework of SPT. Such a development, first of all, is 
perhaps too theological. By this I mean, if we put the core theory of a gracious God at the central 
framework of CIT, then everything belonging to the CIT such as devotional practices, works of 
literature, social and political theorizing, and other forms of cultural expression, etc., has to be 
articulated in relation to this theological foundation. However, in a broader sense, the Catholic 
Intellectual Tradition is a more than 2,000-year conversation about the world, our place in the 
history of salvation, God’s works in the world, and our relation to a gracious God. This tradition 
is broader and older than the six rules of grammar simply working together according to the SPT. 
 
Secondly, when we view the CIT in a broader sense, the development of tradition needs some 
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structural supports from outside the church. In other words, Catholic higher education and its 
institutions can significantly contribute to the development of tradition. They can only do so if 
they receive a legitimate institutional autonomy in order to fulfill their missions, which are to 
receive, create and transmit the Catholic treasury from one generation to another. These 
institutions need their own space, which is an arena of free discussion and exploration, if they are 
to serve the fundamental purposes of a Catholic university or institution dedicated to the pursuit 
of truth and to the intellectual and moral development of their students.127 This understanding of 
development calls for a more relational approach and dialogue between the teaching church and 
the Catholic higher institutions. It is only through the dialogue itself, I think, that the teaching 
church recognizes the working of the Spirit in both the negative and the positive heuristic of 
Catholic Intellectual Tradition.  
 
Conclusion  
Within the framework of this chapter, I have applied the scientific practical theory of tradition to 
articulate and envision the development of Catholic Intellectual Tradition. As we have seen, the 
development of CIT in accordance with the scientific practical theory of tradition is more theo-
centric in its scope through the six rules of grammars working together under the guidance of the 
Spirit. In constructing the CIT, I simplify the contents of tradition, proposing a concrete way in 
which the tradition may develop in insight into realities and words. This tradition has the core 
theory of a gracious God theologically used as a foundational vision in relation to the principles 
of a universal hope, an inclusive community, and the church as sacramental. Together with the 
principles of the analogical imagination and the church’s teaching office as the sixth rule of 
                                                     
127 Leo O’Donovan, “A Letter to Students and Alumni of Georgetown University,” quoted by Louis Dupre, “The Task 
and Vocation of the Catholic College,” in Examining the Catholic Intellectual Tradition, 23. 
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grammar, I attempt to bring these principles together by practically applying the framework of 
Lakatos’s research program to analyze the development of CIT. By doing so, I hope that among 
other ways, we may faithfully keep the contents of tradition, consciously receive it, and 
creatively pass it on from one generation to another. 
 
Thesis Conclusion 
At this stage of the thesis, I believe that I have answered the questions addressed in the 
Introduction. The thesis attempts to interpret the development of tradition according to Dei 
Verbum, explaining how tradition develops in continuity with the apostolic faith, teaching and 
practice. Finally, it makes a proposal for the development of Catholic Intellectual Tradition. At 
the heart of the thesis, I construct a scientific practical theory of tradition by drawing the insights 
from Murphy’s research program for theology, Lakatos’s theory of scientific progress, and 
Tilley’s practical theory of tradition.  
 
In Dei Verbum the bishops of Vatican II claim that under the guidance of the Spirit, the apostolic 
tradition makes progress in the church. It develops in insight into realities and words through the 
contemplation and study of believers, through the intimate sense of spiritual realties that they 
experience, and through the teaching of bishops, who have received the sure charism of truth. As 
I showed in Chapter One, we can interpret the first two ways in which the tradition develops 
according to Tilley’s theory of tradition. Tilley considers tradition and its development as an 
ongoing set of practices constantly being invented and reinvented by a community of 
practitioners when that tradition faces contextual changes. Accordingly, the Catholic tradition 
develops when the believers practice their faith or follow the tradition’s rules of grammar. In 
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other words, by studying and practicing the rules of faith, the faithful consciously participate in 
the tradition, and thereby, creatively hand on the received contents of tradition.  
 
Although Tilley’s theory is rich and insightful, it neither explains the role of the church’s 
teaching office in the development of tradition, nor shows how the three ways in which tradition 
develops relate to one another. This point is manifested in Tilley’s proposal for the Catholic 
Intellectual Tradition, in which he proposes the five rules of grammar to identify and understand 
the tradition. In order to circumvent this problem of Tilley’s theory and offer a more 
comprehensive account of tradition according to Dei Verbum, I integrate Murphy’s theological 
program and Lakatos’s theory of scientific progress into Tilley’s theory, calling it a scientific 
practical theory of tradition.  
 
Lakatos explains the development of empirical knowledge in terms of a scientific research 
program. He views science and scientific development as a network of complex theories whose 
core theory remains the same in the course of its development, while auxiliary theories are 
modified and amplified to account for the core’s meaning and problematic observations. 
Applying Lakatos’s theory into systematic theology, Murphy constructs a research program for 
theology. In this program, the core theory locates at the center of a network of theories. It is 
protected and clarified by auxiliary theories that function as the program’s protective belt of 
negative and positive heuristic. These theories not only further articulate the meaning of the core, 
but also protect the core theory from being falsified. 
 
Drawing the insights from Murphy’s theological program, I construct a scientific practical theory 
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of tradition by integrating a theological program of tradition into Tilley’s theory. In concrete 
terms, the scientific practical theory of tradition views the development of tradition as the 
development of a network of knowledge, whose core theories remain the same in the course of 
the network’s development, while the surrounding theories are modified to protect the core from 
being falsified and to further articulate the meaning of the core theories. This theory suggests that 
the growth of insight in the tradition comes from the tradition’s negative and positive heuristic. 
While the positive heuristic is identified with Christian studies and reflections on the church’s 
defined dogma, I understand the negative heuristic of tradition as one role of the church’s 
teaching office. The office functions as the negative heuristic of tradition to make judgments 
whether some rules of grammar and religious practices are appropriate to follow. Put another 
way, the negative heuristic functions as an authoritative rule to judge whether a development 
within the tradition is authentic, catholic and apostolic.  
 
Applying the scientific practical theory of tradition to analyze the development of Catholic 
Intellectual Tradition, I propose a way in which the CIT may develop. As I have showed in 
Chapter Three, this tradition develops through the five rules of grammar as suggested by Tilley.  
In order to construct a more comprehensive theory of CIT according to Dei Verbum, I take into 
account the six rule of grammar, namely, the teaching office of the church. This rule of grammar 
is proposed to guide the development of tradition, especially the development of Catholic 
theology and Catholic higher education. In accordance with the scientific practical theory of 
tradition, the CIT develops in insights when Catholic intellectuals, the faithful, and theologians 
follow the rules of grammar to clarify the meaning of a gracious God in relation to the tradition’s 
positive and negative heuristic.  
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Given the summary of the thesis as described above, some may question the theoretical and 
practical implications of the scientific practical theory of tradition. In the form of questions one 
can ask: Why is it important to study the development of tradition? To what extent does the 
scientific practical theory of tradition help us understand the life of a particular Christian 
community? What role should the Spirit play in the scientific practical theory of tradition?  
 
The above questions call for further studies to explain how tradition develops as it is received in 
the actual life of a local church. In my view, to be faithful to a tradition, one should study and 
explore the development of tradition because “if conditions and contexts change and practices 
are not adapted and changes in them “invented,” the tradition withers away.”128  
 
More than forty years have passed since the Second Vatican Council ended. In comparison to the 
world before the Council, the present world has changed so much with the development of 
scientific knowledge and its challenge to theology, with the global context of the world and of 
the church, with the influence of secularism upon the believers’ practice of faith, etc. To be 
faithful to the Catholic tradition, I think that the Roman Catholic community has to read the 
signs of the time, constantly rearticulating and inventing the contents of tradition. One way to 
invent tradition is to view it according to the scientific practical theory of tradition. This theory 
offers an active, scientific, and practical approach to the concept of tradition. For those who 
accept the theory, they recognize the need of participating in the tradition, in order to be 
creatively faithful to the tradition and to the teaching of Dei Verbum.  
 
                                                     
128 Tilley, Inventing Catholic Tradition, 121. 
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Facing different challenges that have emerged from the present context of the church, the 
hierarchical magisterium, theologians together with the rest of believers have to faithfully keep 
the Catholic identity and the apostolic tradition’s heritage. We can do so by penetrating into the 
meaning of tradition together with its rules of grammar through an ongoing reflection on the 
church’s teachings, the scriptures and our present experience of spiritual realities. On the other 
hand, we must constantly adapt the contents of tradition and our practices of faith into the 
contemporary world, in order to effectively transmit the tradition and creatively evangelize the 
message of salvation as revealed in the person and works of Christ to the whole world.  
 
Apart from the point I have just mentioned, the scientific practical theory of tradition also gives 
us a framework of imagination to study a particular Christian community. In order to understand 
the life of a Christian community, we can study its rules of grammar as well as how these rules 
are applied in the believers’ practices of faith. However, the problem that I would like to address 
is how to identify the rules of grammar and the way to follow these rules within the context of a 
particular Christian community. If we can identify the rules of a tradition and the way they are 
applied in practices, we can understand how to develop that tradition when the tradition faces 
contextual changes.  
 
The last point that I mention and suggest to researchers relates to the role of the Spirit in the 
scientific practical theory of tradition. As I stated above, the scientific practical theory of 
tradition offers an active, scientific, and practical approach to the concept of tradition. However, 
it does not clarify or present a systematic study of the way in which the Spirit works through the 
believers’ study, experience, and practices of faith as well as through the church’s teaching 
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office. If the role of the Spirit is taken into account, then we could produce a more 
comprehensive theory of the development of tradition according to Dei Verbum.  
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